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Foreword 
This EUI Working Paper is based on research conducted in 2012-2015 in the FP7 project 
SURVEILLE. The research has earlier been reported to the European Commission in the form of what 
in that context is called project deliverables. Most of the deliverables have also been published on the 
website of the project. In order better to reach academic audiences in Europe and beyond, the EUI 
Law Department decided to publish selected SURVEILLE research reports also in the form of 
Working Papers. The current paper is one in that series. 
SURVEILLE (Surveillance: Ethical Issues, Legal Limitations, and Efficiency) was a multidisciplinary 
project that developed a new methodology for the assessment of surveillance technologies. This 
methodology seeks to enable a more rational and structured process of decision-making concerning 
the use of surveillance technologies, as compared to abstract references to the need to find a 
“balance”, for instance between privacy and security. The methodology developed in SURVEILLE is 
based on three parallel expert assessments of the use of any specific surveillance technology in a given 
context. The technology assessment incorporates issues of actual delivery towards a legitimate aim 
such as improved security, and issues of various types of financial cost. It results in a so-called 
usability score, based on ten different criteria. This score can be compared against a fundamental 
rights intrusion score that is based on expert assessments of the importance of a fundamental right 
(often the right to privacy or the right to the protection of personal data) in the situation at hand, and of 
the depth of the intrusion into that right as results from the surveillance. An independent ethics 
assessment will inform the holistic overall assessment and the comparison between the two scores, by 
indicating three different levels of moral hazard in the use of surveillance. The SURVEILLE 
methodology can assist legislators, policymakers, technology developers and end-users of surveillance 
technologies (such as the police or local authorities) in a process of rational, transparent and controlled 
decision-making over surveillance. The traditional legal requirements of legitimate aim, necessity and 
proportionality are all incorporated into the SURVEILLE methodology but in a manner that allows 
their operationalisation through the multidisciplinary approach of the three parallel assessments and an 
informed comparison of their outcomes. 
In addition to developing the assessment methodology as just described, SURVEILLE generated 
multiple lines of academic research on technological, sociological, ethical and legal issues concerning 
surveillance. The current Working Paper emanates from that research. 
In Florence, 30 September 2015  
 
Martin Scheinin, Professor of International Law and Human Rights, EUI 
SURVEILLE Consortium Leader 
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 Abstract 
This paper addresses issues regarding perceptions of surveillance technologies in Europe. It analyses 
existing studies in order to explore how perceptions of surveillance affect and are affected by the 
negative effects of surveillance and how perceptions and effectiveness of surveillance technologies 
relate to each other. The paper identifies 12 negative effects of surveillance including, among others, 
privacy intrusion, the chilling effect and social exclusion, and classifies them into three groups. It 
further illustrates the different ways in which perceptions and effectiveness of surveillance interact 
with each other, distinguishing between perceived security and perceived effectiveness. Finally, the 
paper advances a methodology to take into account perception issues when designing new surveillance 
technologies. By doing so, it rejects manipulative measures aiming at improving perceptions only and 
suggests measures that address the background conditions affecting perceptions.  
Keywords 
perceptions of surveillance, effects of surveillance, effectiveness of surveillance, privacy by design, 
minimum harm by design 
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 1 
Introduction1 
As in the SURVEILLE project as a whole, in this paper “surveillance” refers to activities which aim at 
identifying hazards, typically expected to derive from human criminal conduct. This report focuses on 
“European” perceptions of surveillance, i.e. the way in which surveillance is regarded, understood or 
interpreted by European citizens in the European Union. Moreover, the report explores ways to take 
into account these perceptions when designing new surveillance technologies. Since there is no such 
thing as “the” perception of “the” European citizen, this report is not meant to provide definitive 
statements on “the” way Europeans perceive surveillance. However, taking European citizens as the 
focus of the research means assuming a particular perspective on surveillance. Beyond national, 
cultural and personal differences, indeed, European citizens share a number of common factors that 
influence their perception of surveillance: on the one hand, Europe enjoys a privileged position in the 
world’s politics and economy; on the other, the European Union traces its political, normative 
framework back to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It is from this privileged, 
normatively (civil and political) rights-based stance that European citizens expressed the points of 
view reported here.  
The paper consists of two parts. The first part maps perceptions of surveillance organising them 
around ethical issues. The second part develops a methodology to take into account perception issues 
when designing new surveillance technologies.  
I.  
Perception issues relating to surveillance technologies can be divided into two broad categories. The 
first category includes negative perceptions, which in the SURVEILLE project are considered to be a 
cost of surveillance. The second category concerns perceived effectiveness, a desired effect of 
surveillance technologies.  
As to negative perceptions in general, the surveys analysed allow us to conclude that a negative 
perception of surveillance in Europe is a significant phenomenon which, under certain circumstances, 
may concern up to the majority of citizens. This study identifies 12 effects and side effects of 
surveillance. They are connected to negative perceptions of surveillance in three ways: 1) they may be 
direct sources of negative perception; 2) they may derive from negative perceptions and consist of 
influences on people’s behaviour or 3) since they may pose threats to democracy, rule of law and 
solidarity, they have an impact on society and may influence perceptions of surveillance negatively. 
The table below reports the effects and side effects for each group.  
Negative-perception related effects and side effects of surveillance  
 
Potential sources of negative 
perceptions: 
Potential consequences of 
negative perceptions: 
Impact on society: 
Technologies perceived as 
threats 
Self-surveillance Control society 
Security dilemma and 
surveillance spiral 
Chilling effect 
 
Social exclusion and 
discrimination 
                                                     
1
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Fear of misuse (incl. function 
creep) 
Conformism and loss of 
autonomy 
Social homogenisation 
 
Fear of insufficient protection 
of personal data 
 Decline of solidarity 
 
Fear of unlimited expansion and 
irreversibility 
  
 
As to the positive aspects, i.e. perceived effectiveness of surveillance, this paper identifies three ways 
in which perception and effectiveness relate to each other. First, there is the direct relationship 
between surveillance and perceived security, i.e. the question whether surveillance, independently of 
its actual security improvements, increases perceived security. Studies show little evidence of a causal 
relationship between the deployment of surveillance technologies and a reduction in fear of crime or 
an increase in feelings of security. It seems therefore that feelings of safety depend less on technical 
factors like the installation of a CCTV system and more on other elements like the actual reduction of 
victimisation, familiarity with people, situations and places and the presence of other people. Second, 
there is the relationship between actual and perceived security, i.e. the question whether an 
improvement in actual security brings about an increase in perceived security. The review of existing 
studies points out the so-called “fear of crime paradox”, that is the discrepancy between the objective 
situation and the subjective feeling of security, more precisely: the fear of crime seems to increase or 
decrease independently of crime rates. Third, there is the question whether people think surveillance is 
effective, typically in reducing crime and reducing the fear of crime.
2
 Most of the surveys consulted 
report that the majority of those interviewed does not think of CCTV as effective.  
II.  
The second part of the paper designs a methodology in order to incorporate perception issues in the 
development of new technologies. The proposed methodology builds on the basic assumption that 
interventions to address perception issues are meaningful and compatible with a non-paternalistic 
approach only when preceded by measures that address the background conditions affecting 
perceptions. As to negative perceptions, our methodology envisages three levels of intervention: 
Minimum Harm by Design, Transparency by Design and Accountability by Design. The first level 
aims to minimise the negative impact of technologies on individuals and societies, the second to make 
the way surveillance functions and its improvements transparent to the public and to the people 
affected by surveillance and finally, the third level aims to enable the misuse of technologies to be 
held into account and its authors to be sanctioned.  
Pertaining to perceived effectiveness, the presented methodology foresees two levels of interventions: 
measures at the first level aim at improving effectiveness compatibly with legal, ethical and societal 
restraints and measures at the second aim at making success rates and improvements in effectiveness 
transparent to the public and to people affected by surveillance.  
The part addressing negative perceptions adopts the analysis of perception-related effects and side 
effects of surveillance as its starting point. Its basic assumption expresses the need for individuating, 
addressing and, as far as possible, correcting the rationales for negative perceptions rather than simply 
making the particular technology or its particular use appear “better” than it is. Once the background 
conditions relating to negative perceptions are identified, the proposed methodology envisages three 
levels of intervention:  
                                                     
2
 As we will see, there are many ways people may think of surveillance being effective in reducing crime. They may refer to 
the prevention of crimes being committed through deterrence of potential offenders as well as to the identification of 
offenders in the prosecution phase. See section 3 of this part.  
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1. “Minimum harm by design” (MHbD). Implementing MHbD for surveillance technologies 
implies designing them in a way which makes their negative impact on individuals, on their 
behaviour and on society as small as possible. Although such measures overlap in part with the 
ones prescribed by Privacy by Design, this paper argues that it is more appropriate in this 
context to refer to MHbD.  
2. Transparency by design (TbD). Complying with TbD requires designing technologies in a way 
that makes as much information as possible accessible to the public or to the people affected by 
surveillance. 
3. Accountability by design (AbD). The claim for AbD expresses the idea that the way 
technologies are designed should make cases of misuse and their authors traceable, accountable 
and sanctionable. 
The part of the methodology addressing perceived effectiveness rests upon the idea that interventions 
should first address the background conditions affecting perceived effectiveness and avoid measures 
inspired by the “security theatre”. After identifying the background conditions of poorly perceived 
effectiveness, the proposed methodology requires designing technologies in order to achieve:  
1. Higher effectiveness. This requires improving the system's effectiveness as much as possible 
considering legal, ethical and social restraints; 
2. TbD. In order to achieve TbD for addressing perceptions of effectiveness, technologies should 
be designed in a way that keeps track of their operations. Combined with further information, 
this data on system operations should make it possible to document the success rate of the 
system.  
For both negative perceptions and perceived effectiveness, measures at the institutional, societal and 
legal levels are also required in order to make design interventions fruitful. 
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PART I: Perceptions of surveillance in Europe 
Exploring perceptions 
Definitions and scope 
In the SURVEILLE project, “surveillance” is defined as “targeted or systematic monitoring of 
persons, places, items, means of transport or flows of information, in order to detect specific, usually 
criminal, forms of conduct, or other hazards, and enable, typically, a preventive, protective or reactive 
response, or the collection of data for preparing such a response in the future”.3  
As it follows from the definition above, surveillance is defined as an activity which aims at identifying 
hazards, typically expected to derive from human criminal conduct. The same technologies used for 
surveillance purposes, however, can be, and indeed often are, used for monitoring people’s actions or 
flows of information for purposes other than detecting criminal behaviour or even for criminal 
purposes. This is the case, for instance, when companies use data-analysis software for marketing, 
when CCTV cameras are used by employers to monitor their employees, or when a telephone tap is 
used to collect information in order to plan a kidnapping. These uses are not covered by the 
aforementioned definition of “surveillance” and, although they are not irrelevant in SURVEILLE, they 
are not its focus; consequently, they are not considered here. 
This paper addresses issues related to the perception of surveillance, its effects and side effects.  
At least two basic meanings of “perception” can be identified. They pertain respectively to 1) the 
phenomenon of perceiving objects with our senses: sight, hearing, touch, olfaction and taste and 2) 
“the way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted”.4 Within the context of 
surveillance, it is almost exclusively this second meaning that is dealt with. As we will see, 
perceptions of surveillance include different attitudes such as acceptance or refusal, the feeling of 
being safe, of being under suspicion and so on. These meanings and the way they relate to each other 
are explored extensively below.  
Issues of perception are relevant in SURVEILLE from two points of view. On the one hand, in the 
technology assessment, negative perception is considered to be a cost of surveillance.
5
 “Negative” 
means here a perception subjectively associated with feelings such as unease, fear, annoyance, etc., or 
influencing a person’s attitude toward surveillance in a way that brings this attitude closer to criticism 
or rejection than it was previously. On the other hand, positive perception is to be addressed as 
perceived effectiveness of surveillance, which in turn, aside from actual effectiveness, is a desired 
effect of surveillance technologies.  
The paper analyses the effects and side effects of surveillance by focusing on the relationships 
between them and perceptions. It identifies three groups: the first one consists of effects and side 
effects that may result in negative perception of surveillance, while the second group includes the 
effects and side effects that may result from negative perceptions (i.e. affect people’s behaviour). The 
effects and side effects of surveillance comprised in the third group are more indirectly related to 
perception but are nevertheless relevant here. They have in common 1) an influence on society rather 
than individuals and 2) a negative impact on societal solidarity, the conditions of democracy and the 
                                                     
3 Surveille Project Consortium, Description of Work of the Surveillance Project: Ethical Issues, Legal Limitations and 
Efficiency’, internal document, p. 5.  
4
 Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/perception?q=perception, last visit August, 3rd 2015.  
5
 Surveille Project Consortium, Description of Work, cit., p. 4-5. 
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rule of law. Although in a more reflective way than the effects previously mentioned, the latter effects 
may operate as rationales for negatively perceiving surveillance technologies. 
The paper also investigates the complex relationship between perception and effectiveness of 
surveillance. First, it addresses the question whether the very deployment of surveillance technologies, 
independently of the level of security achieved, increases citizens’ perceived security. Second, it 
examines the relationship between improvements in actual and perceived security. Finally, it deals 
with the question of perceived effectiveness in the narrow sense, i.e. whether the interviewees believe 
that surveillance meets its objectives. 
The subjects of perception 
Perception of surveillance is always situated. This means that it always presupposes not only an object 
but also a subject; it is always a perception of something by somebody. Moreover, the subjects do not 
passively receive the objects of perception, rather they actively constitute what is perceived, for they 
always bring their own (moral) horizons which influence the way they perceive the world.
6
 
SURVEILLE assumes that the subjects of perception are European citizens. Of course, it is not 
possible to speak in abstract and general terms of “the” perceptions of “the” European citizen. 
However, there are some general background conditions that are common to European citizens and 
which may contribute to shaping their perceptions of surveillance. To make them explicit, it is 
therefore necessary to contextualise the following work. 
First of all, seen from a global point of view, Europeans along with the rest of the Western world share 
a privileged position in terms of economic wealth and political power, which has far-reaching 
historical roots, including European expansion into the rest of the world and its aftermath: violent 
conquest, colonialism, exploitation. Secondly, from an internal point of view, European societies share 
a normative political framework marked by the principles of democracy and the rule of law. The civil 
and political rights, now codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are 
centrepieces of this political tradition. This does not mean that authoritarian tendencies and violations 
of human rights are alien to Europe; on the contrary, they are as much inscribed in its history as 
democracy and the rule of law. But on a normative level, political action should be legitimised on the 
basis of the values expressed by the principles of democracy and the rule of law and those values 
constitute an important part of the normative background which influences European citizens’ 
judgements about political choices.  
Beyond such a common European background there are many variables that influence Europeans’ 
perceptions of surveillance. On a national level, for instance, elements such as the history of the 
country (for example a past dictatorship), the level of security attained in a country, the diffusion of 
already existing technologies and the ways the media report surveillance-related issues influence 
citizens’ attitudes toward surveillance. On a personal level the perception of surveillance may be 
influenced by factors such as gender, age, the level of information or misinformation and past 
experience with crime. Personal stances and opinions and the personal level of trust in a given 
government also shape an individual’s perception of surveillance. Moreover, perception is not static 
and contingent factors and occurrences like a terrorist attack and its media resonance can also 
enormously influence people’s understanding and feelings towards surveillance at a particular time.7 
                                                     
6
 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris 1945, 491-492; C. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of 
the Modern Identity, Cambridge 1989, p. 3-24.  
7 For the multiple variables influencing perception see PRESCIENT D3, Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in new 
and emerging technologies: Assessing citizens’ concerns and knowledge of stored personal data, 2012, p. iv and 4-6, 
http://www.prescient-
project.eu/prescient/inhalte/download/PRESCIENT_Deliverable_3_Final.pdf?WSESSIONID=4a58cf9a966a6979f5022ef
c190c7ee2, last access August, 3rd 2015; NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity (e-passport) in the European 
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Finally, perceived proximity to the sources of surveillance is also an important factor influencing 
attitudes towards surveillance: the higher one’s identification with the group surveillance originates 
from, the easier its acceptance.
8
 This is important to point out here because in SURVEILLE the focus 
is on European citizens’ perceptions of practices typically carried out by national security agencies or 
by private security agencies commissioned by domestic institutions, even when, as anticipated above, 
the main targets of such surveillance measures often do not belong to the groups addressed by the 
surveys.
9
  
Although in this paper I also consider studies that interview not just EU-citizens, it can be reasonably 
concluded from their recruitment strategy that most of those interviewed are EU-citizens. Therefore 
the factors mentioned above may be considered to have significantly impacted the points of view on 
surveillance in the surveys analysed here.  
Methodology 
The results presented here are based on the analysis of 22 (meta-)studies, including two reviews of 
several further empirical studies. The studies are listed in Annex 2. I selected them from a broader 
number (over 60) of prima facie relevant studies because they: a) also concern surveillance as defined 
above; b) refer at least in part to Europe; c) make their methodology transparent to the reader, or 
elaborate on existing studies which do the same. 
The studies are very heterogeneous in the type of 
questions they pose to respondents, the range of 
population they target and the kind of 
surveillance they deal with, with a significant 
bias for visual surveillance and CCTV in 
particular (for these two aspects see Annex 3). 
To look for univocal, definitive results that are 
descriptive of “European” perceptions of 
surveillance seems therefore to be a doomed 
task. This is confirmed by two recent, broad-
scoped reviews of empirical studies on 
perceptions of surveillance in Europe, both 
carried out in EU FP7 programmes: SAPIENT 
and PRISMS (for more details on these projects 
see the info-boxes below).  
(Contd.)                                                                  
Union: End-user perspectives on the adoption of a controversial innovation, Journal of Theoretical and Applied 
Commerce Research, 1 (2006), 2, 12-35, p. 27, http://www.jtaer.com/, last access August, 3rd 2015; C. Bozzoli, C. 
Müller, Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK, European Journal of Political 
Economy, 27 (2011), 89-106. 
8 A. T. O’ Donnel et al., Who is watching over you? The role of shared identity in perceptions of surveillance, European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 40 (2010), 135–147. 
9
 On the increasing engagement of the private sector in the security domain and its implications see: L. Zedner, Security, 
London/New York 2009. 
Project information: SAPIENT  
Supporting fundamentAl rights, PrIvacy and 
Ethics in surveillaNce Technologies, 
http://www.sapientproject.eu/ 
SAPIENT is a 36-months lasting project 
which started in February 2011. It aimed “to 
provide strategic knowledge on the state of the 
art of surveillance studies, emerging smart 
surveillance technologies, and the adequacy of 
the existing legal framework” (SAPIENT 
Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of 
the Art, p. ii, http://www.sapientproject.eu/ 
docs/D1.1-State-of-the-Art-submitted-21-
January-2012.pdf). 
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As a part of the review of the state of the 
art, the SAPIENT Deliverable 1.1 
analyses existing statistical studies on 
citizens’ perception of surveillance. In 
doing that, it stresses that there is no 
single public perception of surveillance 
technologies and that positions are 
variable, nuanced and context-
dependent.10 As to the use of closed-
circuit televisions (CCTVs), probably 
the kind of surveillance technology 
which the largest amount of perception 
studies deal with, the SAPIENT 
researchers state: “From reviewing 
existing studies dealing with the public’s 
acceptance or resistance to CCTV 
surveillance, we do not find an 
overarching or common European set of 
concerns”.11  
As a preliminary study for conducting its own survey, the PRISMS Work Package (WP) 7 conducted 
an in-depth analysis of 20 existing statistical studies “on privacy, security, surveillance and trust with 
an evaluation of their reliability, shortfalls and applicability for policy-makers”.12 Also the PRISMS 
report on existing surveys stresses the fact that studies on people’s perception of surveillance lead to 
contradictory findings: “In relation to public attitudes towards surveillance technologies in society, 
eight of the 12 surveys [considered, author’s note] provide evidence that some individuals respond 
positively to the use of surveillance measures to help enhance their security [...]. However, our 
analysis illustrates that individuals’ support of surveillance in the form of CCTV is somewhat 
contradicted by findings from other surveys”.13 
Given this background, the analysis of negative perceptions of surveillance, its effects and side effects 
includes the following two steps:  
(a) First, the analysis bears upon the findings of two large-scale studies in order to make general 
statements about the percentage of people who worry about surveillance being deployed (not 
necessarily on themselves) and how much they worry about surveillance. Here are the 
questions to be addressed in this first phase: Is the negative perception of surveillance a 
relatively limited or a widespread matter? And just how negatively can surveillance be 
perceived? The aim of this part will be to give an idea of the scope of the problem in order to 
be able to better contextualise the results of the second phase. This is not to suggest that scope 
should be equated with relevance. While a widespread phenomenon can be considered 
relevant as such, the reverse is not true: A phenomenon could be relevant even if it affects 
only a small group of people. Moreover, if the group in question is a minority (racial, 
religious, etc.), this may make the phenomenon even more relevant.  
                                                     
10 SAPIENT Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of the Art, 2012, p. ii, http://www.sapientproject.eu/docs/D1.1-
State-of-the-Art-submitted-21-January-2012.pdf), p. 166 and 169, last access August, 3rd 2015. 
11
 Ivi, p. 163. 
12
 http://prismsproject.eu/?page_id=124, last access 24/7/2013. 
13 PRISMS D7.1: Report on Existing Surveys, 2013, http://prismsproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/PRISMS-D7-1-
Report-on-existing-surveys.pdf p. 135, last access August, 3rd 2015. Moreover, I find these statements to be an example 
of how vaguely a general thesis must be formulated in order to be able to condense the results of several surveys.  
Project information: PRISMS 
PRISMS, The PRIvacy and Security MirrorS: 
Towards a European framework for integrated 
decision making, http://prismsproject.eu/?page_ 
id=13 
PRISMS began in February 2012 and ended in July 
2015. It aimed to “analyse the traditional trade-off 
model between privacy and security and devise a 
more evidence-based perspective for reconciling 
privacy and security, trust and concern”. To this 
purpose it also conducted “a representative, trans-
European survey, including 27,000 telephone 
interviews to ascertain citizens’ privacy and security 
perceptions” (PRISMS, http://prismsproject.eu/? 
page_id=124). 
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(b) Second, the study draws attention to factors that are related to perceptions of surveillance in 
the following ways: They can 1) affect perception negatively; 2) potentially derive from 
negative perceptions and result in an influence on people’s behaviour; or 3) through their 
impact on society, operate as further rationales for negative perceptions. Here are the 
questions to be addressed: In which cases do people have a negative perception of 
surveillance? And, how can negative perception affect one’s behaviour? Such analysis leads to 
identify and describe perception-related effects and side effects of surveillance and refers to 
both surveys and literature. It identifies 12 different categories of effects and side effects of 
surveillance.  
For the part dealing with perceived effectiveness, few studies are available.  
Moreover, they focus almost exclusively on CCTV and have local character, most of them having 
been carried out in cities. This is consistent with the character of the crimes the installed CCTV 
systems are supposed to reduce, which are also local in character (theft, burglary, etc.). 
Effects and Effectiveness of Surveillance Technologies: Mapping Perceptions, Reducing Harm 
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Negative effects of surveillance  
Negative perception: the dimension of the phenomenon 
To address the first cluster of issues, I consider those studies to be adequate which: a) Like the other 
studies considered here, apply to surveillance as defined in SURVEILLE; b) have a large number of 
respondents involved as opposed to a small sample; c) carry out interviews in a significant number of 
European countries and d) carry out the studies on the basis of a clear, transparent and rigorous 
methodology.
14
 Although I present the main results of those studies, I use them only to give a rough 
idea of the dimension of the phenomenon and not to further calculate averages and percentages based 
on their results.  
Only two studies meet the aforementioned criteria: URBAN EYE and Flash EUROBAROMETER 
225 (hereafter just EUROBAROMETER 225, for more details on both projects see the info-boxes 
below). Out of the six broad surveillance-areas that can be identified (visual surveillance, 
dataveillance, biometrics, communication surveillance, sensors and location determination 
technologies),
15
 the URBAN EYE and EUROBAROMETER 225 studies cover only three: visual 
surveillance (URBAN EYE), dataveillance and communication surveillance (EUROBAROMETER 
225). This deficit might be overcome by the PRISMS survey, whose results have been only partially 
published so far.
16
  
Although the authors of the URBAN 
EYE final report warn: “our findings 
are in formal methodological terms 
neither strictly representative nor 
comparable”,17 the main findings of 
the interviews may be tentatively 
summarised as follows. 
As to the acceptance of CCTV, 
attitudes differ considerably 
depending on where the CCTV is 
placed and the city where the 
interview is carried out. At a 
minimum, 4.3% of respondents find 
CCTV in banks to be a “bad thing”, 
while disapproval is highest 
regarding CCTVs placed in clothing 
store fitting rooms (73% of 
respondents). As to CCTVs in 
general, the largest number of people 
who have critical attitudes are in 
Vienna (41% of respondents), while 
                                                     
14
 The assessment of this last point also relies on the analysis carried out in PRISMS, for both of the selected studies are also 
considered in PRISMS. 
15
 SAPIENT D1.1, cit., p. 23 
16 As of August, 3rd 2015. 
17
 L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report, 2004, p. 1, http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ 
ue_wp15.pdf. Last access: August, 3rd 2015. 
Project information: URBAN EYE 
http://www.urbaneye.net 
The URBAN EYE project started in September 2001 and 
ended in June 2004. It took an interdisciplinary perspective 
to study the expansion, deployment, social impact and 
political implications of CCTV in seven European 
countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, 
Hungary, Norway and Spain. It focused on “CCTV 
surveillance in both public areas and private but publicly 
accessible spaces such as shopping malls or railway 
stations” (Hempel, L., Töpfer, E.: URBAN EYE Working 
Paper n. 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report, p. 10). In order 
to investigate the social implications of CCTV, in 2003 the 
research team conducted street interviews with 1000 
citizens in Berlin, Budapest, London, Oslo and Vienna. The 
interviews were based on standardized questionnaires. In 
addition, the URBAN EYE team conducted in-depth 
interviews with 30 respondents. 
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the smallest number is reported in London (4% of respondents). As to risks connected to CCTV, 53% 
of respondents agree that “CCTV footage can be easily misused”18 and 40% “believe that CCTV 
invades privacy”.19  
According to the EUROBAROMETER 
225, a majority of citizens are concerned 
about privacy when their personal data are 
held by organisations (64% of 
respondents). More than one third (34%) 
of respondents are very concerned. Such 
results, however, do not distinguish 
between the different types of 
organisations that can hold citizens’ data 
and also relate to organisations that have 
nothing to do with surveillance. However, 
the study also provides specific 
information about police and local 
authorities, two organisations that also 
handle citizens’ data for surveillance 
purposes. As to the police, there is a European average of 17% of respondents who do not trust them 
handling their personal data. This study, like the URBAN EYE survey, shows a considerable diversity 
of results among the European countries. For instance, in Finland only 5% of respondents do not trust 
the police to handle their personal data, whereas in Lithuania the rate of mistrust reaches 49% of 
respondents. A European average of 29% of respondents do not trust local authorities to hold their 
data, with a minimum in Denmark (10%) and a peak in Lithuania (52%). As to communication 
surveillance, a European average of 19% of respondents would not accept, under any circumstances, 
monitoring internet usage to combat terrorism and 25% of respondents would not accept, under any 
circumstances, monitoring telephone calls for the same purpose.  
As we have seen, the results of both the URBAN EYE and the EUROBAROMETER 225 survey can 
be used here only with caution and should not be generalized. With regard to the former, the findings 
are admittedly not representative and with regard to the second, the focus of the surveys is not on 
surveillance. Moreover, the percentage of citizens who have a negative perception of surveillance (in 
the form of or depending on non-acceptance, mistrust of the surveillors, or privacy-intrusion) varies 
considerably depending on the context of deployment and the country of provenience. However, the 
results presented above seem to provide a sufficient basis to formulate the following, quite modest but 
sufficient for our purposes, conclusion:  
Negative perception of surveillance in Europe is not a marginal phenomenon. Under certain 
circumstances it may concern up to the majority of citizens.
20
 A considerable number of them may 
perceive surveillance in a very negative way. 
 
Negative-perception related effects and side effects of surveillance 
This enquiry refers to both small-scale studies and literature. Studies are considered that: a) relate at 
least in part to “surveillance” as defined in SURVEILLE and b) involve at least one European country.  
The relevant effects and side effects of surveillance that emerge from the studies are related to 
negative perception in three ways: 1) they may be direct sources of negative perceptions; 2) they may 
                                                     
18
 Ivi, p. 45. 
19
 Ibidem. 
20
 I am not considering cases here in which the rate of citizens perceiving surveillance negatively is higher because they refer 
to situations that are too specific (i.e. the use of CCTV in fitting rooms) to be generalisable.  
Project information: EUROBAROMETER 225 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
The Eurobarometer surveys are conducted on behalf 
of the European Commission to monitor attitudes and 
perceptions of European citizens on a wide range of 
topics. EUROBAROMETER 225 was conducted in 
2008 and consists of interviews mainly carried out via 
landline-telephones. The interviews cover all the 27 
member states and include about 1000 citizens from 
each state. The focus of the survey is on data 
protection, data privacy and data security but do not 
relate exclusively to surveillance.  
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derive from negative perceptions and consist of influences on people’s behaviour or 3) their impact on 
society may influence the perception of surveillance negatively.  
The 12 types of effects and side effects of surveillance are summarised in Annex 1, organised 
accordingly to the group they belong to. 
 
Potential sources of negative perceptions 
(a) Surveillance technologies being perceived as threats/harassments themselves 
This side effect of surveillance concerns the fact that surveillance technologies can make people feel 
uncomfortable even when perceived as being used properly, i.e. in conformity with the stated goals 
and legal requirements.  
This has to do with the fact that “surveillance technologies may interfere with various aspects of 
people’s lives” and may be perceived as restricting people’s privacy and freedom of movement.21 
Examples of this kind of side effect are reported, among others, in the study BIOMETRICS AND E-
IDENTITY with regard to the proposed introduction of e-passports and in the URBAN EYE project 
regarding CCTV.
22
 In both surveys, the deployment of surveillance is felt as an invasion of privacy.  
A slightly different variant of this side effect which surveillance may cause has to do with the feeling 
of being “under suspicion”. On the one hand, surveillance can make people feel like a suspect a priori, 
for they may be and often are surveilled without having previously shown any “dangerous” behaviour. 
On the other hand, as reported by the PRISE Project,
23
 surveillance may make surveilled persons 
afraid of confirming such prejudice and being classified as “dangerous” by authorities. This time it is 
not on the basis of a general “presumption of guiltiness”, but as a consequence of their behaviour, as it 
is difficult to know in advance which behaviour could be classified as suspect.
24
  
(b) Security dilemma and surveillance spiral 
The security dilemma consists of security technologies increasing people’s feelings of insecurity 
rather than making them feel safer. This may happen in two ways.  
First, “the usage of surveillance technologies […] may have the effect of (over-) sensitizing people to 
the perception of threats and just making them feel unsafe: «The more these security strategies take 
effect, the greater the sensitivity to the continuing lack of security, the remaining risks and to the fact 
that threats have not disappeared by far»”.25 This phenomenon may take many forms, result in 
diffused sensitivity involving society as a whole or manifest itself in very specific circumstances. In 
                                                     
21 SURVEILLE D3.1, Report describing the design of the research apparatus for the  
European level study of perceptions, 2012, http://surveille.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/D3.1-Report-describing-the-
design-of-the-research-apparatus.pdf, last access August, 3rd 2015, p. 14. 
22
 NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity, cit., p. 21 and L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit., p. 8. See also 
M. Gill et al., Public perceptions of CCTV in residential areas: “It is not as good as we thought it would be”, 
International Criminal Justice Review, 17(2007), 304-324, p. 321. 
23
 PRISE (“Privacy enhancing shaping of security research and technology”, http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/index.htm). 
24 V. Pavone, M. Pereira, The privacy vs. security dilemma in a risk society. Insights from the PRISE project on the public 
perception of new security technologies in Spain, 2008, http://www.wiscnetwork.org/ljubljana2008/papers/WISC_2008-
110.pdf, p. 22, last access August 3rd 2015. 
25 SURVEILLE D3.1, cit., p. 15; quote from H. Münkler, Strategien der Sicherung. Welten der Sicherheit und Kulturen des 
Risikos. Theoretische Perspektiven, in H. Münkler, M. Bohlender, S. Meurer (eds.): Sicherheit und Risiko. Über den 
Umgang mit Gefahr im 21. Jahrhundert, Bielefeld 2010, 11-34, p. 12-13: „Je besser diese Strategien der Sicherung 
greifen, desto stärker wird die Sensibilität für die fortbestehende Unsicherheit, für immer noch vorhandene und noch 
längst nicht verschwundene Bedrohungen.“ 
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this restricted form it may manifest itself, for instance, when the fear of crime diminishes in the places 
where CCTVs were installed but increases in places where there is no video surveillance.
26
 Studies 
carried out in the UK and in Germany also report that people worry more about crime when a CCTV 
system is installed, possibly because the presence of cameras makes the places seem more dangerous 
than otherwise.
27
  
Second, those very surveillance technologies may be perceived as sources of new risks. For instance, 
the very fact that there are people surveilling others gives rise to the risk of misuse by the surveillance 
operators,
28
 or the very deployment of surveillance (in combination with repressive migration laws) at 
borders may increase the risk of death or injury during attempts to cross these borders.  
In both cases this may lead to a further side effect of surveillance: in order to compensate for 
increasing insecurity, more surveillance is required, which in turn may further increase insecurity. As 
a result, a sort of surveillance spiral is triggered.
29
  
(c) Fear of misuse, including function creep 
The fear of the misuse of surveillance is somehow related to the former, since this too may be derived 
from a perceived lack of control of or mistrust of the operators.  
The Synthesis Report of the PRISE Project deals with such a phenomenon in its generality, affirming 
that “more than 60 percent of the participants in the six countries [where the survey was carried out, 
author’s note] believe that new security technologies are likely to be abused by governmental 
agencies”.30 The URBAN EYE report also shows similar findings telling that 50% of respondents 
believe that “footage can be easily misused”.31 The report BIOMETRICS AND E-IDENTITY also 
refers to the perceived risk of abuse of personal information made available for e-passports
32
.  
A specific kind of misuse of surveillance known as “function creep” occurs when the use of a 
technology expands gradually beyond its original scope and purpose. Examples of function creep 
include: drones developed for military purposes used in civilian contexts to observe public assemblies, 
demonstrations and other public events;
33
 CCTVs installed in the retail sector for the purpose of 
                                                     
26 Chen-Yu Lin, Öffentliche Videoüberwachung in den USA, Großbritannien und Deutschland – Ein Drei-Länder-Vergleich, 
2006, http://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/bitstream/handle/11858/00-1735-0000-0006-B3C4-7/lin.pdf?sequence=1, last visit 
August, 3rd 2015 p. 87-88. 
27 D. Williams, J. Ahmed, The Relationship Between Antisocial Stereotypes and Public CCTV Systems: Exploring Fear of 
Crime in the Modern Surveillance Society, 2009, https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2299/4794/1/903645.pdf, last 
access 24/7/2013; N. Zurawski, „It is all about perceptions‘: CCTV, feelings of safety and perceptions of space - what the 
people say”, Security Journal, 23 (2010), 259-275.  
28 C. Ketzer, Securitas ex Machina. Von der Bedeutung technischer  ontroll- und  berwachungssysteme f r  esellschaft 
und Pädagogik, 2005, http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/1861/, last access August, 3rd 2015, p. 36.  
29
 Jonathan Herington also points out: “In surveillance the actions of the government to prevent terrorism (i.e. by surveilling 
email) are often interpreted by targeted communities as suspicious, so they respond defensively (by using Lavabit), which 
is then interpreted by the government as suspicious, so they take steps to counter (i.e. by shutting down Lavabit), and so 
on...”, Jonathan Herrington, personal comment on this paper. 
30
 PRISE D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on Security Technology and Privacy, 2008, 
http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/docs/PRISE_D_5.8_Synthesis_report.pdf, last access August, 3rd 2015, p. 25.  
31
 L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit., p. 8.  
32 NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity, cit., p. 21. For a general reference to function creep see also PACT Summary 
of PACT Deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, 2012, http://www.projectpact.eu/documents-1/privacy-security-research-paper-
series/%233_Privacy_and_Security_Research_Paper_Series.pdf, August, 3rd 2015, p. 94. 
33
 SURVEILLE D3.1, cit., where it is also brought up that: “this phenomenon is sometimes given another name. Daniel 
Solove, for example, uses the concept of «secondary use» in his essay «I’ve got nothing to hide and other 
misunderstandings of privacy»: «Secondary use is the use of data obtained for one purpose for a different unrelated 
purpose without the person’s consent», s. D. J. Solove, I’ve got nothing to hide and other misunderstandings of privacy, 
San Diego Law Review, 44 (2007), 745-772, p. 767. 
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preventing theft subsequently being used to monitor employees
34
 or for voyeurism;
35
 CCTV originally 
intended to monitor traffic used for observing “social fringe groups”;36 dataveillance technologies 
developed in democratic states and then sold to authoritarian regimes to oppress political opponents.
37
  
(d) Fear of insufficient protection of personal data 
Similar to the previous effect but still different is the fear that personal data collected through 
surveillance may be not sufficiently protected from other people or organisations accessing them. 
Although this effect may also derive from mistrust of the operators, it differs from the previously 
discussed effect because it does not concern the fear of a potential misuse by the operators; rather, it 
relates to their possible carelessness in allowing third parties access to the information held by them. 
The study BIOMETRICS AND E-IDENTITY reports this side effect, referring to respondents 
worrying about possible illegal access to biometric information held by authorities for producing e-
passports.
38
  
(e) Fear of unlimited expansion and irreversibility of surveillance 
A last side effect of surveillance that may influence people’s perception negatively has to do with the 
feeling that some protective barriers are falling away once surveillance technologies are introduced.  
This may happen in two ways.  
First, while the initial introduction of a particular technology may put up with resistance, it is much 
easier to expand its use after overcoming initial opposition. This is distinct from function creep 
because there must not necessarily be a change in the function for which the technologies are used. 
This aspect is mentioned in the PACT report “Privacy and Security”.39  
Second, as reported by the PRISE project, there is the feeling that once a technology has been 
introduced it will be almost impossible to make it disappear again, even if it emerges that the 
technology is misused, ineffective, unnecessary or dangerous.
40
 
Potential consequences of negative perception: self-normalization and influences on behaviour 
We shall now turn to the effects of surveillance that, potentially deriving from negative perceptions, 
result in a modification of people’s behaviour.  
(a) Self-surveillance 
A common basis of these effects can be traced back to self-surveillance as the mechanism that links 
negative perception and behaviour. The concept of self-surveillance has been developed by Michael 
Foucault
41
 and is described by Daniel Solove as follows: “by always being visible, by constantly living 
under the reality that one could be observed at any time, people assimilate the effects of surveillance 
into themselves. They obey not because they are monitored but because of their fear that they could be 
                                                     
34 W. Peissl et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen der Videoüberwachung, 2011, <http://epub.oeaw.ac.at/ita/ita-
projektberichte/d2-2a58.pdf>, last access August, 3rd 2015, p. 5.  
35
 Chen-Yu Lin,  ffentliche Video berwachung, cit., p.  4. 
36
 EPTA, ICT and Privacy in Europe. Experiences from technology assessment of ICT and Privacy in seven different 
European countries, 2006, http://www.ta-swiss.ch/publikationen/2006/, last access August, 3rd 2015, p. 36.  
37 This was for instance the case of Siemens Nokia selling technologies to the Iranian regime, s. PACT Summary of PACT 
deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 85. 
38
 NG-Kruelle et al., Biometrics and e-identity, cit., p. 21. 
39 PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 95. The pact report, however, does not rigorously distinguish 
such phenomenon from function creep. 
40 PRISE D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on Security Technology and Privacy, cit., p. 24. 
41
 M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris 1975. 
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watched. This fear alone is sufficient to achieve control.”42 Surveillance need not actually take place: 
the possibility of being surveilled is already enough to bring about obedience.  
This phenomenon is also known to psychologists, who stress that the feeling of being continuously 
watched can bring about changes in the psyche of the observed, who becomes “more circumspect, 
timorous and suspicious”.43 
(b) Chilling effect 
The chilling effect is defined as “the disinclination to take part in certain activities which liberal theory 
considers entirely legitimate, such as free association, free speech and political organisation. If one 
worries that such behaviour is punishable in any way, or that it draws unwanted attention to oneself on 
the part of authorities, one is subject to [it, author’s note]”.44 Moreover, for fear of “doing wrong”, 
people can also withhold from helping people in need. In the words of Nils Zurawski: “people 
abdicate from their responsibility as soon as a camera is recording. Interviews, for example, have 
shown that some people are afraid of doing wrong when helping someone. Thus, they preferred not to 
help when under surveillance.”45 
(c) Conformism and loss of autonomy  
Besides refraining from engaging in some public activities, people may also develop a tendency to 
conform as a consequence of surveillance. This derives from the feeling of being “under suspicion” 
described above: if people know that any movement, any word might be recorded and considered 
“suspect”, they may try to avoid any “deviant” behaviour in order to avoid attracting attention.46  
Seen from another point of view, this side effect may be described as a loss of autonomy: people under 
surveillance do not behave in accordance with their “own” reasons but rather in accordance with what 
they think they are supposed to do in order not to be sorted out as “deviant”.47  
Effects of surveillance on society 
There is a third group of effects and side effects of surveillance which affect society as a whole rather 
than individuals. Its common characteristic is the restrictive impact on the background conditions and 
basic principles of democracy, rule of law and solidarity.  
Thereafter they may influence people’s perceptions of surveillance negatively, although in a more 
reflective way than the effects listed above, for the negative perception derives here from the 
knowledge of the impact such technologies may have on our societies.  
For the description of such effects we rely more on literature than on surveys. This derives from the 
societal character of the effects listed here. Since they do not directly impact individuals, they are 
seldom mentioned in interviews asking about citizens’ perceptions of surveillance (as opposed to 
effects affecting individuals more immediately, like the ones listed above). As a consequence, their 
description is based more on scholars’ elaborations than on survey results.  
                                                     
42
 D. J. Solove, The Digital Person. Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, New York 2004, p. 31. 
43
 Chen-Yu Lin,  ffentliche Video berwachung, cit., p. 82. 
44
 DETECTER D 12.2.1, Quarterly Update on Technology 1, 2009, http://www.detecter.eu/index.php?option=com 
_content&view=section&id=7&layout=blog&Itemid=9, last access August, 3rd 2015, p. 4. 
45
 N. Zurawaski: Kameras lösen keine Probleme, ZEITonline, Available at: http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/schule/2011-
11/schule-kamera-zurawski, last visit August, 3rd 2015; as quoted in SURVEILLE D3.1, cit., p. 15. 
46
 W. Peissl, et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen, cit., p. 10 and F. Helten, B. Fischer, Urban Eye WP 13, What do 
people think of CCTV. Findings from a Berlin Survey, 2004, http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp13.pdf, last access 
August, 3rd 2015. 
47
 W. Peissl, Surveillance and Security. A Dodgy Relationship, 2002, http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/pdf/ita_02_02.pdf, last 
access August, 3rd 2015, p. 8-9. 
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(a) Control Society: Reversing the presumption of innocence 
According to Gilles Deleuze, from the beginning of the Nineties Western societies were developing 
from disciplinary societies into “control societies”.48 In such a society, different but interrelated 
mechanisms provide the possibility for a short-term, quick-response, continuous and unlimited control 
over individuals. As examples of such mechanisms, Deleuze mentions locating technologies that make 
information available on people’s positions in open spaces at any time.  
Clive Norris and  ary Armstrong have elaborated on Deleuze’s interpretation. In their view, in control 
societies, the maximisation of control over citizens is justified as a means to prevent as many offences 
as possible. Such an ambition of control societies to prevent offences from being committed requires a 
further critical change: instead of being considered innocent until proven guilty, “everyone is assumed 
guilty until the risk profile assumes otherwise”.49 These authors refer to the right to be presumed 
innocent in a broad, moral meaning rather than in a strictly legal way. As such, it may be understood 
as the right to be treated as trustworthy.
50
  
The maximisation of control and the reversion of the presumption of innocence have an impact on the 
way security is perceived in society, suggesting that everybody is a potential risk.
51
  
(b) Social exclusion and discrimination 
The risk of social exclusion brought about by surveillance is reported often in the literature, 
particularly in relation to visual surveillance. It is argued that visual surveillance promotes the 
application of categorical suspicion: controllers tend to equate whole social categories, sorted out on 
the basis of appearance and visible traits such as colour, clothing, etc., with dangerous groups. This 
strengthens prejudices because it seems to confirm them, thus amplifying social exclusion.
52
 Social 
sorting, i.e. the activity of sorting groups of people from others in order to treat them differently, is 
indeed one of the main functions of contemporary surveillance according to David Lyon.
53
 
Although this risk is evident for visual surveillance, it may affect other kinds of surveillance as well 
because it may occur at any time that collected data may be used to categorise people on the basis of 
their supposed risk potential. Digital data collected through dataveillance, for example, may lead to 
creating a false, high-risk profile that may, in turn, influence one’s chances of finding a job, thereby 
strengthening prejudices and social exclusion.
54
  
Studies indicate also that visual surveillance in particular may have the effect of keeping particular 
social groups away from places where their presence is perceived by other people as disturbing. This 
is the case for instance of homeless or poor people and punks in shopping malls, exclusive holiday 
resorts or city centres.
55
 Even though the studies do not explicitly describe how this effect comes 
                                                     
48
 G. Deleuze, Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle, L’autre journal, 1, Mai 1990. See also D. Kammerer, Bilder der 
Überwachung, Frankfurt am Main 2008, p. 131-142.  
49
 C. Norris, G. Armstrong, The maximum surveillance society, 1999, p. 24. 
50
 See SURVEILLE D4.5: Paper on the ethical risks of surveillance technologies in prevention, investigation, and 
prosecution of crime. 
51 PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 95. 
52 L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit., p.7; Chen-Yu Lin,  ffentliche Video berwachung, cit., p. 79 ff.; PACT 
Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6, cit., p. 94-95; M. Apelt, N. Möllers, Wie intelligente“ Video berwachung 
erforschen? Ein Res mee aus zehn Jahren Forschung zu Video berwachung, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 
(2011), 4, 585–593, p. 590; D. Williams, J. Ahmed, The Relationship, cit. See also T. G.Patel, Surveillance, Suspicion 
and Stigma: Brown Bodies in a Terror-panic Climate, Surveillance&Society, 10 (2012), 3/4, 215-234. 
53
 D. Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as social sorting: privacy, risk, and digital discrimination, London 2003. 
54
 W. Peissl et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen, cit., p. 10. 
55
 L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, The Surveillance Consensus: Reviewing the Politics of CCTV in Three European Countries, 
European Journal of Criminology, 6 (2009), 2, 157-177. 
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about, it may happen in two ways: either through operators directly intervening and forcing people to 
leave, or because the very feeling of being targeted by surveillance can be enough to make 
“undesired” people keep away. Such effect, at least when caused by the operators’ intervention, 
contrasts clearly with the principle of non-discrimination, as sanctioned among others in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
56
  
(c) Social homogenisation 
This effect of surveillance derives directly from the influences on individuals’ behaviour described 
above: the chilling effect and conformism. In the view of Daniel Solove: “Chilling effects harm 
society because, among other things, they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the degree of 
freedom with which to engage in political activity.”57  
At the same time, conformism may lead to societal stagnation, since deviant and dissenting behaviour 
is considered to be an important driving force for societal change.
58
  
Both effects can impact democratic life and impede it from developing and flourishing. 
(d) Decline of solidarity 
This last effect of surveillance is also directly related to surveillance’s influence on people’s 
behaviour, in particular to the chilling effect described above.  
I have already mentioned the fact that people may abstain from helping others when under 
surveillance because of being afraid to make mistakes. But beyond that, surveillance technologies may 
also induce people to delegate their responsibilities towards others to such technologies: “people no 
longer feel responsible for their fellow citizens as soon as surveillance technologies are installed. In 
other words: The fact that people tend to rely absolutely on surveillance technologies may lead to a 
decline in mutual responsibility and a lack of moral courage which may have serious consequences for 
the way people live together in a society”.59  
                                                     
56
 Art. 21.  
57 J. D. Solove, The Digital Person, cit., p. 31, as quoted in SURVEILLE D3.1, cit. Both the chilling effect and its societal 
impact are also reported in W. Peissl et al., Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen, cit., p 10-11.  
58 W. Peissl, Surveillance and Security, cit., p.8. 
59 SURVEILLE D3.1, cit.; Chen-Yu Lin,  ffentliche Video berwachung, cit., p. 75; S. Graham et al., Towns on the 
Television: Closed Circuit TV Surveillance in British towns and cities, 1995, Working Paper No. 50, University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne, http://www.ncl.ac.uk/guru/assets/documents/ewp17.pdf, last access August, 3rd 2015; J. Ditton, 
Crime an the city. Public Attitudes towards Open-Street CCTV in Glasgow, The British Journal of Criminology, 40 
(2000) 4, 692-709, p. 707. 
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Effectiveness and perceptions 
The relationship between perceptions and effectiveness  
Tackling the question of the perceived effectiveness of surveillance technologies is a complex task. 
Intuitively, one might assume that the perceived and the actual effectiveness of surveillance are 
related, yet the very existence of such a relationship is controversial. Even if we assume its existence, 
it is neither unequivocal nor easy to understand.  
Perceived effectiveness refers quite obviously to the question whether people think surveillance 
achieves the aims it is deployed for. But these differ from one technology to another, often remain 
implicit or are imprecisely formulated.
60
 As a consequence, it is likely that people do not know the 
exact purposes surveillance technologies are deployed for, so the way they perceive the effectiveness 
of such technologies may be accordingly distorted. As we will see, most of the studies that tackle this 
matter consider reduction of crime and reduction of fear of crime to be the purposes of surveillance 
and ask people if they think surveillance technologies achieve these aims.  
Moreover, the expression “perceived” effectiveness is somehow misleading, for it suggests that there 
is a subjective, variable effectiveness opposed to an “actual” effectiveness which is objective, 
impersonal and fact-based. This is however not the case because reducing the fear of crime or, more 
positively yet less precisely formulated, increasing feelings of safety are just as common priorities of 
surveillance as reducing crime or increasing security.
61
 Actual effectiveness, therefore, has to do with 
perceptions and feelings too: both actual security (crime reduction/security improvement) and 
perceived security (reduction of fear of crime/ increase of the feeling of safety) are aspects of actual 
effectiveness.
62
 Furthermore, as shown in the SURVEILLE Deliverable 3.4, beyond the perceptive 
component of effectiveness, there is currently no objective, impersonal and fact based definition of 
effectiveness available for surveillance technologies. 
                                                     
60
 The difficulties related to the task of assessing the effectiveness of surveillance technologies are explored in more detail in 
D3.4 „Design of research methodology for assessing effectiveness of selected representative surveillance 
systems“,http://surveille.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/D3.4-Design-of-a-research-methodology-for-assessing.pdf, 
last visit August 3rd 2015.  
61
 The latter is a less precise formulation than the negative one because feelings of “safety” may also include economic and 
social aspects which are beyond the aims of surveillance. The literature does not distinguish unequivocally and rigorously 
between “safety feeling” and “security feeling”, so both expressions are used to refer to the same phenomenon. Although 
attempts to clarify the meaning of “safety” have been made (see N. Möller at al., Safety is More than the Antonym of 
Risk, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23 (2006), 4, 419-432 and N. Möller, The Concepts of Risk and Safety, in S. 
Roeser, R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, M. Peterson (Eds.), The Handbook of Risk Theory, Epistemology, Decision Theory, 
Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk, Dordrecht etc. 2012) more research is needed here. This is however a task 
beyond the scope of this paper. This paper adopts the expression “safety feeling”, except when quoting from authors 
doing otherwise. 
62
 PACT D1.4 Societal Impact Report, 2012, http://www.projectpact.eu/deliverables/wp1-root-branch-review/d1.4-social-
impact-report, last access August 3rd 2015, p. 16.  
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Perceptions and effectiveness  
But the matter is even more complicated, and the relationship between actual and perceived 
effectiveness is in part a circular one. Let us illustrate this with an example. In a parking area a CCTV 
system is installed in order to reduce crime (say, theft of or from vehicles and assault) and to make car 
users feel safer when they park there. If CCTV park users actually feel safer after the installation than 
before, just because they see the cameras, this may indicate that CCTV is effective in this respect 
because it achieved the goal of making people feel safer. But they may also feel safer because they 
think that since the installation of CCTV crime rates in the parking area have decreased, 
independently of whether they actually did or not. In this case, the increased feeling of safety may 
indicate that CCTV is perceived to be effective. So the feeling of safety can relate both to actual 
effectiveness (as perceived security) and to perceived effectiveness.  
The picture below illustrates the overlap and interaction between the two aspects of effectiveness. 
 
Actual and perceived effectiveness – Interaction and overlap 
To sum up, although the distinction between perceived and actual effectiveness is methodologically 
useful and is employed in this paper, two caveats should be kept in mind: 1) despite what the 
expressions “perceived effectiveness” and “actual effectiveness” may suggest, perception issues are 
part of both actual and perceived effectiveness; 2) a clear distinction between the two is not always 
possible nor does authentically describe the complex role perception plays in matters related to 
effectiveness.  
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Perception aspects of effectiveness 
As we have seen, the effectiveness of surveillance technologies encompasses perception-related 
aspects as well: surveillance technologies are effective if they increase perceived security, i.e. if they 
increase feelings of safety or reduce fear of crime.  
The matter is twofold: on the one hand, it involves the direct relationship between surveillance and 
perceived security, i.e. the question whether surveillance, independently of its actual security 
improvements, increases perceived security; on the other hand, it refers to the relationship between 
actual and perceived security, i.e. to the question whether an improvement in actual security brings 
about an increase in perceived security. 
The two points are not identical, as it is not obvious that the deployment of surveillance technologies 
increases actual security. Tackling such matters is beyond the scope of this paper, so it will be enough 
here to quickly recall that the results of several studies challenge the assumption that surveillance 
improves actual security.
63
  
The fact that surveillance does not necessarily bring about an increase in actual security and that 
perceived and actual security often do not overlap opens up the possibility for what is called the 
“security theatre”. This “covers measures taken, ostensibly in the name of security, whose value lies 
solely (or at least mostly) in their capacity to give the reassuring impression that something is being 
done, that steps are being taken, that someone is on the case—rather than in actually increasing 
security, considered from an objective standpoint. The role of security theatre is to increase perceived 
security, without necessarily having any positive effect in terms of actual security”.64 
Surveillance and perceived security 
Does the deployment of surveillance technologies per se bring about an improvement in perceived 
security? Studies show little evidence of a causal relationship between the deployment of surveillance 
technologies and a reduction in fear of crime or an increase in security feelings.  
A first group of studies finds little evidence and limited change to have occurred after the installation 
of CCTV. The URBAN EYE report and a study carried out in the German city of Regensburg, for 
instance, report that only a minority of those interviewed affirms to feel safer since CCTV systems 
have been installed.
65
  
A second group of studies finds that in some cases the installation of CCTV negatively influences 
citizens’ perceived security. In a study carried out in Glasgow, for instance, the percentage of those 
                                                     
63 B. C. Welsh, D. P. Farrington, Home Office Research Study 252, Crime prevention effects of closed circuit television: a 
systematic review, 2002, http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/video_surveillance/PDFs/Welsh&Farrington_2002.pdf, 
last access August, 3rd 2015; and M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, Home Office Research Study 292, 
2005, https://www.cctvusergroup.com/downloads/file/Martin%20gill.pdf, last access August 3rd 2015. However, few 
studies are available on this topic and the matter is complicated by the fact that there is no clear methodology for 
assessing the effectiveness of surveillance technologies. See SURVEILLE D3.4, Design a research methodology for 
assessing the effectiveness of selected surveillance systems in delivering improved security, September 2013, 
<http://surveille.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/D3.4-Design-of-a-research-methodology-for-assessing.pdf >, last 
access August 3rd 2015. 
64
 PACT D1.4 Societal Impact Report, cit., p. 16. 
65
F. Helten, B. Fischer, Urban Eye WP 13, What do people think of CCTV, cit.; G.  locke et al., Das Hintert rchen des 
Nichtwissens,   r erre  te    ol  e : CILIP, 69 (2001) 2, http://www.cilip.de/ausgabe/69/video.htm, last access August 
3rd 2015; Chen-Yu Lin,  ffentliche Video berwachung, cit., p. 77; M. Apelt, N. Möllers,  ie 
intelligente“ Video berwachung, cit. See also Brown, B., CCTV in Town Centres: Three case studies, Police Research 
Group. Crime Detection and Prevention Series; Paper No. 68, 1995, <http://www.popcenter.org/responses 
/video_surveillance/pdfs/brown_1995_full.pdf>, last access August 3rd 2015. 
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who say that they avoid the city centre has increased after the installation of CCTV.
66
 The same 
studies find no evidence that, in general, the installation of CCTV in Glasgow has a positive impact on 
fear of crime. A study by Gill and Spriggs carried out in different cities in the UK also finds out that, 
in general, feelings of safety have little improved after the installation of CCTV. Moreover, in 
particular cases, an increase in the fear of crime is even registered: in two of the surveilled areas, 
people who are aware of the installation of CCTV worry more often about crime than those unaware 
of the CCTV. The authors interpret these findings as indicators that the presence of cameras can make 
a place appear less safe than one would have assumed.
67
 I already referred to such phenomenon in 
section 2 as the “security dilemma”.  
Drawing from such studies and others, several authors point out that feelings of safety depend less on 
technical factors like the installation of a CCTV system and more on other elements like the actual 
reduction of victimization (i.e. the experience of having been the victim of a crime), familiarity with 
people, situations and places and the presence of other people.
68
  
Actual and perceived security  
In the previous sub-section, I addressed the question whether the deployment of surveillance 
technologies per se increases perceived security, independently from the question whether it also 
increases actual security. Now I shall assume that security technologies increase actual security and 
will ask whether, and if yes how, this impacts perceived security.  
Intuitively, one could assume that perceived security is in a cause-effect relationship with actual 
security: the higher the actual crime reduction, the higher the safety feelings, and vice-versa. This is 
partly true, and there are surveys that indicate the existence of a link between victimization and the 
fear of crime. So, for instance, a study carried out in the UK finds out that people who were victim of 
a crime in the year before the interview are three times more likely to worry about crime than non-
victims.
69
 
However, the relationship between fear of crime and reduction of crime is not always so direct as the 
abovementioned findings would suggest.
70
 On the contrary, often the objective situation and the 
subjective feeling do not seem to be correlated: crime rates may increase and the fear of crime may 
decrease, and vice versa. To describe such phenomenon scholars speak of the “fear of crime paradox”.  
This might derive from a misevaluation of the risks related to criminality, which in turn may be 
influenced by several factors. First, people may have an unrealistic perception of how likely it is that 
they become the victim of a crime (false perception of “personal risk”). For instance, statistics often 
report that women are more afraid of becoming victims of violence, although in fact men are far more 
often victims of violence than women.
71
 Second, people may misperceive the likelihood of a particular 
                                                     
66
 J. Ditton, Crime an the city, cit., p. 698; Avoidance behaviour, i.e. to avoid going to certain areas (at certain times) is 
considered in this and other surveys as a sign of lack of safety feeling: people avoid certain places if they do not feel safe 
there.  
67
 M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit., p. 48. Such findings are confirmed in D. Williams, J. Ahmed, The 
Relationship Between, cit. 
68
M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit.; M. Apelt, N. Möllers,  ie intelligente“ Video berwachung, cit; 
N. Zurawski, „It is all about perceptions‘, cit. 
69
 M: M. Gill et al., Public perceptions, cit., p. 311 
70
 S. for instance H-J. Lange, M.  asch, “Subjektives Sicherheitsgef hl“,  örterbuch zur inneren Sicherheit,  iesbaden, 
2006, p. 323.  
71
 S. for instance SuSi-PLUS, Subjektives Sicherheitsempfinden im Personennahverkehr mit Linienbusse, U-Bahnen und 
Stadtbahnen, Auszug aus dem Abschlussbericht: Zusammenfassung und wichtigste Ergebnisse, http://www.susi-
team.de/images/stories/Downloads/band7summary.pdf, 2005, last access August, 3rd 2015, p. 11-12 and the UNECE 
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crime being committed in general or in a particular situation (false perception of “situational risk”). 
Parents, for instance, are increasingly worried about their children becoming victims of sexual assault, 
although the number of cases is decreasing, and women are afraid of sexual violence in public spaces, 
although statistics show that two thirds of the cases of sexual violence take place at home or inside the 
family.
72
  
Explanations for such a paradox have been advanced by scholars coming from sociological, 
psychological, evolutionistic and mixed backgrounds.
73
  
Although there are many studies on the relationship between actual risk and risk perception, very little 
can be found dealing specifically with surveillance technologies. Apart from the study already 
mentioned by Gill and Spriggs, I found no survey measuring the impact of a surveillance system on 
actual security and on perceived security and comparing the two. A study carried out in the CPSI 
project, however, indirectly tackles the matter.
74
 It investigates, among others, the relationship 
between acceptance of security interventions by the state and perceived security in seven European 
countries (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) and, against expectations, it uncovers no evidence of the existence of such relationship. 
Moreover, the authors argue that political and cultural factors also play a role in shaping the 
relationship between actual and perceived security. On this basis they interpret the main findings of 
the surveys. These include uncovering discrepancies between criminal statistics and the level of fear of 
crime. So, for instance, the study reveals a social “overfear” of crime in Austria and an “underfear” 
security culture in Germany; i.e. that in Austria people are more fearful about crimes being committed 
than a realistic consideration of statistics on crime would suggest, while in Germany the fear of crime 
is low compared to actual crime rates.  
Perceived effectiveness 
The question to be addressed here is: “do people think surveillance is effective, typically in reducing 
crime and reducing the fear of crime?” 
Surveys generally report a high acceptance of CCTV systems, so it is somehow puzzling to find out 
that, as the same studies show, most people do not think of CCTV as effective. The PRISE deliverable 
5.  reports that “approximately 70 percent of the participants in the six countries completely or partly 
agree to the statement that many security technologies do not really increase security, but are only 
being applied to show that something is being done to fight terror. The technologies are simply 
implemented for political reasons”.75 Studies carried out in the URBAN EYE project and in the city of 
Hamburg confirm such scepticism with reference to CCTV.
76
 The former study reports that 55% of 
respondents agree with the statement that CCTV “displaces rather than reduces” crime; only 23% 
believe that it “prevents serious crime”, and only 29% affirm that they would feel safer if more CCTV 
systems were installed. Similar results are found in Hamburg: almost 60% of respondents believe that 
(Contd.)                                                                  
(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) statistical database at http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/database/STAT/30-
GE/07-CV/?lang=1, last access 25/7/2013.  
72
 M. Apelt, N. Möllers, ie „intelligente“ Video berwachung, cit., p. 5  . 
73
 Ivi; H-J. Lange, M.  asch, “Subjektives Sicherheitsgef hl“, cit.; B. Schneier, The Psychology of Security, 2008, 
<http://www.schneier.com/essay-155.html>, visited on August, 3rd 2015; S. Roeser, R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, M. 
Peterson (Eds.), The Handbook of Risk Theory, part 4; K. Boers, P. Kurz, Kriminalitätseinstellungen, soziale Milieus und 
sozialer Umbruch, in K. Boers, G. Gutsche, K. Sessar (eds.), Sozialer Umbruch und Kriminalität in Deutschland, 
Opladen 1997, 187-254; D., Die Entwicklung von Kriminalität und Kriminalitätsfurcht in Deutschland – Konsequenzen 
für die Kriminalprävention, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kommunalwissenschaften, 42 (2003), 1, 31-52. 
74
 CPSI Analytical Standpoint 13, Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies, 2010, http://www.esci.at/eusipo/asp13.pdf, last 
access August, 3rd 2015.  
75
 PRISE D5.8, cit., p. 22. 
76
 Urban Eye P 15, cit., p. 9, 13, 17 and p. 45; N. Zurawski, “It is all about perceptions”‘, cit., p. 269. 
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CCTV displaces crime instead of solving it, while only 43% feel that cameras protect them against 
crime.  
Other studies register that people’s belief in the effectiveness of CCTV has declined after their 
installation. A study conducted by Gill and Spriggs in the UK, for instance, asks people in residential 
areas before and after CCTV installation whether they think that: a) people are more likely to report 
incidents to the police when CCTV is present; b) the police react more quickly if CCTV is installed 
and c) crime decreases after the installation of CCTV. In all cases, people are less prone to agree with 
such statements after the installation of CCTV.
77
 These and similar results from other studies have 
been interpreted as a consequence of a more realistic attitude towards CCTV after seeing them in 
action: “It was not as good as they thought it would be; it was not responsible, as far as they could 
assess, for tackling crime”.78  
However, contrary to the findings of the abovementioned surveys, one of the available studies reports 
that a majority of people believe that CCTV is a meaningful tool to reduce criminality.
79
 
Results 
The analysis of existing studies on perceptions of surveillance shows that a negative perception of 
surveillance in Europe is a very context-dependent issue. Places and situations where they are 
deployed and national differences play a major role in shaping the perception of such technologies. As 
to the relationship between perception and effectiveness, it emerges from the studies presented here 
that this is a complex relationship, with no cause-consequence link between the two.  
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 M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit., p. ix-x and 57. 
78
 M. Gill et al., Public perceptions, cit., p. 322. 
79 K-H. Reuband, Video berwachung. as B rger von der  berwachung halten, Neue Kriminalpolitik, 13 (2001), 2, 5-9, p. 
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PART II: Methodology to incorporate perception issues in the design of new 
technologies 
Building the methodology 
Building on the results of the surveys on perceptions of surveillance presented above, this paper 
proposes a methodology to incorporate perception issues in the design phase of new technologies. The 
methodology should enable developers of new technologies to design them in a more perception-
sensitive way.  
As we have seen, perception issues surrounding surveillance can be divided into two broad groups: 
negative perceptions and perceived effectiveness. Because the two kinds of perceptions relate to two 
distinct frameworks, this paper develops the methodology to address each of them in two distinct 
parts.  
However, the two parts of the methodology are based on the same basic idea and present similar 
structures. The common idea behind both parts of the methodology consists in the need to avoid 
manipulative interventions that aim at addressing perceptions only, without substantively improving 
the technologies. The common structure of the two methodology parts derives from their common 
founding idea and consists of successive steps firstly addressing the background conditions from 
which negative perceptions or perceptions of poor effectiveness arise and, secondly, perception itself.  
After developing the two parts of the methodology, I will highlight their similarities and combine the 
results in common methodological guidelines.  
Negative perceptions and design 
As its starting point, the proposed methodology for addressing issues of negative perceptions adopts 
the analysis of perception-related effects and side effects of surveillance, instead of focusing primarily 
on technologies and their uses.  
The undesirability of negative perceptions is twofold. On the one hand, in SURVEILLE, negative 
perception is considered to be a cost of surveillance technologies. On the other hand, as argued above, 
the perception-related effects and side effects of surveillance impact individuals’ behaviour and 
society in a way that threatens the background conditions and basic principles of democracy, the rule 
of law and solidarity.  
Addressing background conditions rather than surfaces 
In looking for a methodology to incorporate perception issues in the design phase of new technologies, 
I take into account both aspects of such undesirability. This means that this methodology rejects 
approaches aiming exclusively to act on the surface of the (side)effects by improving perceptions 
without tackling the actual problems (which often correspond to the effects and side effects of 
surveillance). Such an approach would be incompatible with the basic principles of the rule of law and 
democracy.  
The following example illustrates what I mean by interventions aiming only to cosmetically address 
perceptions. Take the case of a CCTV system installed in a park which raises privacy concerns within 
the public, which, in turn, influence peoples’ perceptions of CCTV surveillance negatively. A possible 
way to address perception issues could include measures such as an advertising campaign presenting 
CCTV systems as friendly to park-visitors, painting the cameras green in order to make them blend 
into the scenery better, or making covert use of them in order to make park visitors unaware of their 
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existence. Independently of the question whether such measures would be effective in the short and 
long run, our approach rejects them because of their paternalistic character. They conflict with our 
conception of human beings as rational and autonomous persons that a democratic and rule-of-law 
oriented approach should adopt. Instead, I propose a methodology that takes people’s concerns 
seriously, questions the actual problems behind them and seeks to address them effectively.  
Our option for a background-oriented approach is expressed by the basic assumption of the proposed 
methodology:  
In order to address perception issues in a way that is compatible with fundamental rights and 
democratic principles, the background issues affecting negative perceptions rather than perceptions 
only should be tackled in the first place.  
This does not mean that the background issues affecting perception negatively are always identical 
with the most apparent potential rationales for it. For instance, our example of CCTV reveals that the 
most obvious rationale for negative perceptions can be a real invasion of privacy. However, further 
conditions may potentially cause negative perceptions, including a lack of knowledge about the 
existing privacy-preserving features of the CCTV system, or a lack of transparency in the way they are 
communicated to the public. The rationales for negative perceptions vary for each case and are 
context-dependent. Identifying them is therefore a task to be carried out on a case-by-case basis.  
Whatever the rationales for negative perceptions in a particular case are, the first basic assumption of 
the proposed methodology expresses the need of individuating, addressing and as far as possible 
correcting them rather than simply making the particular technology or its particular use appear 
“better” than it is in order to avoid or minimise negative perceptions. In our example with CCTVs, 
corrective measures could aim at reducing the installation of cameras to a minimum, while providing 
extensive information on existing protective mechanisms and/or improving communications 
transparency. 
The three levels of intervention 
Once the background conditions related to negative perceptions are identified, the proposed 
methodology envisages three levels of intervention. In the design phase of new technologies, measures 
should be taken at each of the three levels in order to effectively address the background conditions of 
negative perceptions and the negative perceptions themselves:  
 At the first level, measures should be adopted in order to achieve “minimum harm by design” 
(MHbD); 
 At the second level, measures should be adopted to implement transparency by design (TbD); 
 At the third level measures should be adopted that aim at enhancing accountability by design 
(AbD). 
Interventions at the first level put into effect the idea expressed in the basic assumption that it is 
necessary to actually improve the technologies and their uses in order to minimise negative 
perceptions and that a purely cosmetic intervention on the perception level is not sufficient. The two 
subsequent levels specifically address perceptions: they express the idea that, once realised, actual 
improvements should also be made transparent and verifiable. Only in the rare event where negative 
perceptions arise exclusively from a lack of transparency, from misinformation or from the wrong 
kinds of communication strategies can interventions take place primarily at the second and third level.  
 
Minimum harm by design (MHbD) 
Implementing MHbD for surveillance technologies implies designing them in a way which makes 
their negative impact on individuals, their behaviour and society as small as possible. 
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MHbD can be achieved, for instance, by designing the technologies in a way that makes them invade 
privacy as little as possible and that minimises the possibilities of misuse. A type of technology or a 
system can be designed to reduce its privacy impact, for example, by making it collect as little 
personal data as strictly necessary for achieving its goals or by making people as unidentifiable as 
possible, or by elaborating the collected data in a decentralised way. How this applies to each type of 
technology is a matter to be solved case by case, and it does not solely depend on the technical 
characteristics of a type of technology or system but also on its destination, the context of deployment, 
etc.  
Existing examples of how to implement such proposals focus on mechanisms to enhance data 
minimisation. Pioneering proposals date back to the mid-Eighties, when David Chaum proposed a 
large-scale transaction system like the ones used for electronic payment, that is a system that provides 
security for organisations without requiring the identification of users.
80
 More recently, Claudia Diaz 
et al. presented a system for signing electronic petitions that allows controllers to detect double 
signatures and signatories to protect their privacy through anonymity.
81
 Moreover, Josep Balash et al. 
elaborated a prototype electronic toll pricing system that minimises the privacy impact principally by 
decentralising the processing of data, thus reducing the quantity of data transmitted to the central 
database. The presented toll pricing system is able to prove to the central system that the information 
transmitted is genuine without disclosing fine-grained location data that would reveal sensitive 
information about the users.
82
 Further examples include proposals to make smart CCTV systems at 
airports less privacy-intrusive
83
 and to encrypt by default the images of individuals collected by 
drones.
84
  
One recurrent though not strictly necessary feature of such proposals is decentralisation: the proposals 
show that it is possible to leave a greater amount of information in the hands of the persons whose 
personal data are handled without jeopardising the functionality and security of the system. Hence, 
when meaningful, MHbD requires achieving as much decentralisation as possible.  
Focusing on this level of intervention can be particularly effective to mitigate negative perceptions 
arising from side effects of surveillance such as the ones dealt with under number 1 (technologies 
perceived as threats), 3 (fear of misuse) and 4 (fear of insufficient protection of personal data). 
However, interventions at the other two levels are necessary as well. 
The notion of MHbD overlaps in part with the notion of Privacy by Design (see info-box), nowadays a 
well-established and increasingly successful set of principles.
85
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Although I recognise the validity of the research done in the PbD realm, I prefer, nevertheless, not to 
refer to PbD here and elaborate instead on the notion of MHbD for the following reasons:  
 “PbD” misleadingly suggests that technologies complying with its requirements bring about an 
improvement of privacy. The expression “MHbD”, on the contrary, signalises that surveillance 
technologies always bring about a negative impact on individuals and society and that this 
impact can be minimised at best but will never be completely eliminated.  
 PbD focuses on information privacy, i.e. privacy regarding the collection and use of personal 
information. However, it is neither proven that (information) privacy is the only right threatened 
by surveillance, nor that threats to other rights and values necessarily depend on a previous 
violation of (information) privacy or that they would not take place if the invasion were to be 
removed. The answer to the question whether intrusions in information privacy are always the 
preconditions for further violations mostly depends on the definition of “privacy” adopted, 
which is itself a controversial matter.
86
 Moreover, as the following example illustrates, whether a 
violation of fundamental rights and values depends on a previous privacy intrusion is a matter of 
perspective. Take, for example, the effect “social exclusion and discrimination” and a CCTV-
surveillance scenario. In our scenario, the installed CCTV system incorporates biometrical facial 
recognition, which allows for the identification of the people filmed. If people are considered to 
be suspect on the basis of any of the data collected by the CCTV system, they are singled out for 
further checks. To select suspects, the operators also use categorical suspicion based on 
appearance. By removing biometrical identification, the system would be made less intrusive to 
privacy. However, the effect “social exclusion and discrimination” would not diminish unless 
the skin colour of a person or the way she is dressed were also concealed in the output image of 
the CCTV system. Of course, one could object that concealing the particular features of people 
filmed is also a privacy-preserving measure. However, an approach that focuses not only on 
privacy like the one proposed here seems able to solve such problems in a more straightforward 
way. By referring to a “minimum harm” rather than only "privacy" I aim not to exclusively 
restrict a priori the field of intervention into privacy-related issues.  
 PbD targets whole organisations’ practices instead of kinds of technologies or technology 
systems. PbD, for instance, does not primarily or exclusively prescribe how a licence plate 
recognition system should be designed in order to minimise its impact on privacy. Instead, 
Cavoukian’s approach targets the whole context in which such a system is adopted and 
prescribes measures regarding, say, the code of conduct for employees handling the data, or the 
legislative measures limiting the uses of the data. Although such a holistic approach is 
meaningful and technical aspects should not be addressed in isolation from the organisational, 
societal, political and legal context in which they are used, I find it to be more fruitful, for 
analytical purposes, to keep the different stages separate. I therefore concentrate here on the 
technological aspects that a) reduce technologies' negative impact on perception through 
reducing the impact on basic values of solidarity, democracy and the rule of law; b) make it 
possible and meaningful to adopt further strategies at the institutional, political, legal and 
societal level that further reduce the impact on negative perceptions and the abovementioned 
values.  
 As pointed out in different contributions, current definitions of “PbD” are so vague that they do 
not provide guidelines on how to translate its principles into engineering practices for designing 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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new technologies
87
. Given these shortcomings, PbD risks becoming a label with which to 
reassure consumers and the public without bringing about real improvements for privacy - 
exactly the opposite of our first basic assumption.
88
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INFOBOX: PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
 
(See Cavoukian, Ann, 'Privacy by Design. The 7 Foundational Principles', August 2009, 
<http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf/>, accessed 
August, 5
th
 2015) 
 
Ann Cavoukian introduced the concept of PbD in the Nineties to address the growing challenges 
posed by new technologies to the protection of personal information
1
. PbD aims to make privacy 
assurance the default mode of operation for organisations, and, according to Cavoukian, it may be 
attained by acting in accordance with the following seven foundational principles of PbD:  
 
1. Proactive not reactive; preventive not remedial.  
This principle expresses the idea that PbD should act proactively, preventing privacy 
intrusions from happening instead of intervening after they have occurred.  
2. Privacy as the default setting. 
No action should be required by users in order to protect their privacy: Personal data should 
be automatically protected as the default rule.  
3. Privacy embedded into design. 
Privacy should be embedded into the system from the beginning; it should belong to its core 
functionality instead of being added after the system has already been designed.  
4. Full functionality – positive-sum, not zero-sum. No trade-offs between privacy and security 
are necessary: in the PbD approach it is possible to have both.  
5. End-to-end security – full lifecycle protection. 
Because privacy protection is embedded into the system from the design phase, it is operative 
before personal information is collected. This should guarantee the protection of personal 
information throughout the whole lifecycle of data processing. 
6. Visibility and transparency – keep it open. 
This principle aims at assuring stakeholders that the system is operating in a privacy-
protecting manner and is subject to independent verification.  
7. Respect for user privacy – keep it user-centric.  
Users' interests should have the highest priority both in the design and operating phases.  
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Transparency by design (TbD) 
Transparency by design means that technologies should be designed in a way that makes as much 
information as possible accessible to the public or to the persons affected by their use (typically people 
affected by surveillance).  
The way technologies are designed should, for instance, enable the group of people targeted by 
surveillance to know the following:  
 For what purposes the technologies were created;  
 How the technologies are used and whether these uses correspond with the original/authorised 
purposes;  
 How much and what kind of personal information is collected using the technologies, how it is 
used and for how long it is kept;  
 Who operates the technologies and who has access to the data collected by them;  
 What measures of MHbD are implemented in the technologies and what are their limits;  
 What measures of AbD (see below) are implemented in the technologies and how they can make 
use of them;  
 How they can access the information listed above.  
As the list above shows, transparency should also cover, but not only, the other two levels of 
intervention: MHbD and AbD.  
The quantity and kind of information made available and to whom varies largely depending on the 
technology, its particular use and the context of deployment.  
In general, there are two broad categories of information about surveillance technologies: general and 
personal. They should be made available according to two different strategies: general information 
should be publicly available, whereas personal information should be made available only to the 
persons to whom it belongs. For instance, in the case of a licence plate recognition system on a 
motorway, the information available to the whole public could include: the purposes for which it was 
installed; the authority which authorised the installation and for what purposes and under what 
limitations; whether the system works in a covert, overt or opaque manner; what kinds of data are 
collected; how long they are kept before being definitively deleted; to whom they are communicated; 
who has access to them. Annual reports subjected to independent verification can be a way to make 
such kinds of information public.89 Clearly, the general public should not have access to the actual 
database – however, the persons whose data were collected should. In this case, then, the plate 
recognition system should be designed in a way that makes it possible for each individual to know 
whether her vehicle had been tracked by the system, when and where it happened, who/which 
organisation or agency accessed the data, what was done with the data, whether they were deleted at 
the right time or not and so on.  
The way to access these pieces of information should be straightforward and uncomplicated; no 
special skills or knowledge should be expected in order to have access to them: No more, say, than the 
ability to use a smart phone if the technology in question is a smart phone, or no more than the ability 
to browse the internet if the technology in question is an internet browser. As per our example of a 
plate recognition system, no more skills than the ones necessary for obtaining a driving licence and 
carrying on the usual bureaucratic activities related to the possession of a car (such as stipulating an 
insurance and paying car taxes) should be necessary to access the data.  
If supported by appropriate measures such as the ones suggested in the frameworks MHbD and AbD, 
the focus on this level of intervention can be particularly effective against side effects of surveillance 
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such as number 5 (Fear of unlimited expansion and irreversibility) and numbers 6 to 8 (self-
surveillance, chilling effect, conformism and loss of autonomy). Transparency about the objectives 
and uses of surveillance technologies can, for instance, be effective in minimising the fear of unlimited 
expansion and irreversibility, while clear and precise information about where and when surveillance 
takes place and about the criteria for suspicion can minimise self-surveillance and the related side-
effects of societal chill, conformism and loss of autonomy. These examples make the interdependence 
of the three levels clear: transparency, of course, can be counter-productive if the objectives of 
surveillance are too broad, if surveillance is ubiquitous or if the criteria for suspicion are too vague.  
Accountability by design (AbD) 
The claim for AbD expresses the idea that the way technologies are designed should make cases of 
misuse and their authors traceable, accountable and sanctionable. 
Examples of misuse of surveillance technologies include the following:  
 Deployment beyond the original purposes; 
 Use in places or situations that are not authorised or not identical with the original ones;  
 Use of the collected data for purposes that are not authorised or different from the original ones;  
 Non-authorised circulation of the collected data;  
 Use of the collected data beyond the authorised time-frame;  
 Deployment of the technologies and/or use of the collected data in a discriminatory way.  
Proposals of designs that enable accountability focus on logs registering access and handling of 
personal data. Such systems have been applied to e-mail service providers handling e-mail users’ data, 
bank operators handling the personal data of bank customers, or operators accessing data collected by 
drones.
90
 Existing literature shows that systems can be designed in a way that enables a posteriori 
checks about compliances with the data usage rules.  
Even if AbD does not influence specific effects and side effects of surveillance, it seems to be the key 
for the effectiveness of MHbD and TbD because they may function effectively only if checks are 
possible.  
Beyond design 
The remedies foreseen by the proposed methodology are meaningful and can be effective only if 
backed up by a broader context in which they can actually operate. For instance, the technical features 
of a particular technology allowing for tracking accountability for violations and misuse are 
meaningful only in a context that foresees sanctions for such violations.  
Pertaining to such a context, among others, are societal, institutional, political and legal settings.  
Examples of measures at the legal level include mandatory, previous judicial authorisation for the 
deployment of surveillance technologies; strict and binding codes of conduct for surveillance 
operators and a mandatory two-signature protocol to access data collected by surveillance systems.
91
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Other, non-legal measures include public discussions carried out routinely before the installation of 
new surveillance systems and centres for facilitating communication between individuals and 
institutions.
92
  
Moreover, making different, practicable options available to individuals can strengthen the results 
attained by applying the proposed methodology. There should be options between not flying at all and 
letting one’s biometric data be collected, or between having one's email exchange intercepted vs. 
having to renounce writing emails.  
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Perceived effectiveness and design 
The study presented in the first part of this paper pinpoints three variations of the relationship between 
perception and effectiveness. The first relates to the question whether surveillance, independently of 
its actual security improvements, increases perceived security. The second way perception and 
effectiveness relate to each other concerns the relationship between actual and perceived security, i.e. 
to the question whether an improvement in actual security brings about an increase in perceived 
security. The third variation of the relationship between perception and effectiveness is properly called 
perceived effectiveness. It relates to the question whether people think surveillance is effective, 
typically in reducing crime and reducing the fear of crime. 
The first and the second way perception and effectiveness interact with each other seem to be 
determined by factors external to the use of surveillance such as social and interpersonal relationships 
and the actual crime rates. Hence, it seems that a meaningful intervention for addressing perception in 
these cases should focus on those external factors rather than on the design of new technologies.  
Therefore I will concentrate here on the third way perception and effectiveness relate to each other, i.e. 
on perceived effectiveness.  
There are many ways people may think of surveillance as being effective in reducing crime: for 
instance, they may refer to the prevention of crimes being committed due to the deterrence of potential 
offenders as well as to the identification of offenders in the prosecution phase. Respondents’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of surveillance vary considerably, but, unfortunately, surveys 
available often do not clearly distinguish between them.
93
  
How can such perceptions be addressed already in the design phase of new technologies? 
Addressing background conditions rather than surfaces/II 
As in the case of negative perception, the proposed methodology for perceived effectiveness is based 
on the idea that measures aimed at addressing perceptions only are insufficient. Therefore, the basic 
assumption of the proposed methodology can be reformulated as follows:  
Interventions should first address the background conditions affecting perceived effectiveness rather 
than only focus on perceptions.  
In the realm of perceived effectiveness, the basic assumption expresses the need to avoid measures 
inspired by the so-called “security theatre”. This “covers measures taken, ostensibly in the name of 
security, whose value lies solely (or at least mostly) in their capacity to give the reassuring impression 
that something is being done, that steps are being taken, that someone is on the case—rather than in 
actually increasing security, considered from an objective standpoint. The role of security theatre is to 
increase perceived security, without necessarily having any positive effect in terms of actual 
security”.94 
In the design of new technologies, interventions inspired by the security theatre should be avoided for 
two reasons. First, like in the case of negative perception, manipulative interventions would contradict 
and threaten basic principles of democracy and the rule of law. Second, as demonstrated by the 
analysis of surveys carried out in part one of the paper, respondents are aware of the possibility that 
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measures are taken just to reassure people, without tackling the actual problems.
95
 Therefore, besides 
being morally and politically problematic, approaches inspired by the security theatre do not seem to 
have good chances of success.  
Two levels of intervention 
After looking for the background conditions of poorly perceived effectiveness, the proposed 
methodology requires designing technologies in order to achieve  
1. Higher effectiveness 
2. TbD 
The first point requires acting accordingly with the basic assumption: the first question to ask is 
whether the perception that technologies are poorly effective is well-grounded. If this is the case, the 
first step consists of improving the system's effectiveness as much as it is compatible with legal, 
ethical and social restraints.  
Only after dealing with actual effectiveness are further measures meaningful. Efficiency and 
effectiveness issues have been tackled extensively in the SURVEILLE Deliverables 3.3 “Report on 
system effectiveness, eff   en y and sat sfa t on assessment” and 3.4 “Design of a research 
methodology for assessing the effectiveness of selected surveillance systems in delivering improved 
security.
96
  
As to AbD, at this stage of research it seems that no measures of AbD are needed for addressing issues 
of perceived effectiveness.  
Transparency by design (TbD) 
In order to achieve TbD for addressing perceptions of effectiveness, technologies should be designed 
in a way that keeps track of their operations. Combined with further information, this data on system 
operations should make it possible to document the success rate of the system.  
 From the collected data it should be possible to reconstruct, for instance:  
1. How many cases the system analysed;  
2. How many warnings the system issued; 
3. How many warnings eventually led to successful interventions and how many did not; 
4. Whenever possible, how many potential dangers or infractions the system failed to detect.  
For instance, a metal detector used for luggage screening at airports should keep track of the number 
of items examined and of the number of items selected for further checks, and such data should be 
combined with information from the security agencies on the number of dangerous items eventually 
detected and, whenever possible, the number of dangerous items that went undetected through checks. 
An electronic plate recognition system should keep track of the number of vehicles tracked and of the 
number of infractions registered; these data should be combined with the number of infractions 
eventually sanctioned and, whenever possible, with the number of infractions that remained 
undetected.  
Beyond design 
In the case of perceived effectiveness as well, design measures should be supported by a social, 
political, institutional and legal context that makes them fruitful.  
                                                     
95
 See above, part I, section 3. 
96
 Available at the SURVEILLE website <http://surveille.eui.eu/research/publications/>. 
Effects and Effectiveness of Surveillance Technologies: Mapping Perceptions, Reducing Harm 
33 
First, as we have seen, the data collected should be integrated and elaborated in order to gain 
knowledge about the actual effectiveness of the technologies considered. The data keeping track of the 
system functionality should be integrated with data on the number of false positives, false negatives 
and of the success rates. Such data should be further statistically elaborated.  
Second, openness about the effectiveness of surveillance technology is needed. Both raw data and 
statistics should be made public. Annual reports about the effectiveness of different security 
technologies, including information about the strengths and limits of each technology, could also be a 
useful instrument for backing up TbD. Whether the further use of a technology is meaningful or not in 
the light of effectiveness should be a matter of public and open debate. 
Third, consequences have to be drawn from the information about effectiveness. If a technology 
proves to be inadequate for achieving the purposes for which it was adopted, it should not be used 
anymore. Clearly, this presupposes that the purposes of the deployment of a particular technology 
should be clearly stated from the beginning.  
Finally, statistical data and further information about the effectiveness of surveillance technologies 
should be communicated in a way that takes into account the most recent research on the perception of 
risk and the role of emotions in risk perception.
97
 Existing psychological research shows, on the one 
hand, a possible link between the communication of information and the acceptance of security 
interventions and, on the other hand, that acceptance increases when decisions about the deployment 
of security technologies are perceived as fair and transparent.
98
  
Combined methodological guidelines 
So far the methodologies for addressing negative perceptions and perceived effectiveness have been 
developed separately. However, the two methodologies have a parallel structure and several 
similarities. It is thus possible to combine them in the following methodological guidelines.  
The first step for applying the methodology is to ask if the technology to be developed may be 
perceived negatively and whether it will be perceived as being effective. This preliminary inquiry may 
rest upon surveys (existing on similar technologies or ad hoc) and on the basis of simulations and 
literature. The inquiry should aim at finding out whether the new technology, in the context for which 
it will be employed:  
(a) potentially has the following negative perception-related effects and side effects:  
1. Technologies perceived as threats; 
2. Security dilemma and surveillance spiral; 
3. Fear of misuse (incl. function creep); 
4. Fear of insufficient protection of personal data; 
5. Fear of unlimited expansion and irreversibility;  
6. Self-surveillance; 
7. Chilling effect; 
8. Conformism and loss of autonomy;  
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9. “Control society”;  
10. Social exclusion and discrimination;  
11. Social homogenisation;  
12. Decline of solidarity. 
 
and  
(b) may be perceived as “security theatre” or otherwise ineffective.  
Once the potential (side)effects of the use of a technology in a particular context are identified and it 
has been ascertained that it may be perceived as poorly effective, the second step consists of 
identifying the actual circumstances from which such perceptions arise, according to the basic 
assumption of the proposed methodology.  
The successive steps consist of interventions at the further levels: minimum harm, transparency and 
accountability by design to address negative perceptions, improvements on effectiveness and 
transparency by design to address perceived effectiveness. 
The table reported in Annex 5 outlines the methodological guidelines for addressing both negative 
perceptions and perceived effectiveness.  
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Need for further research 
Beyond the specific reported above, the research conducted also highlights trends and shortcomings of 
current research on perceptions of surveillance which might be useful for future studies.  
As to the state of the art of European research on perceptions of visual surveillance and CCTV in 
particular, the following considerations regarding the relationship between the groups targeted by 
surveillance and the sample represented in the interviews may be advanced.  
Depending on which technologies and for what purpose they are deployed, specific groups of people 
are more affected than others by surveillance. This is the case, for instance, with CCTV, which is most 
commonly deployed to address “undesired” behaviours that have little to do with (serious) crime and 
terrorism.  ith the words of Martin  ill, CCTV, for instance, is used “extensively as a means of 
controlling alcohol-related and other anti-social behaviour in town and city centres, monitoring and 
dispersing large groups of individuals and moving on what many operators termed ‘undesirables’, 
such as beggars and on-street traders”.99 Another example is technologies used for border-control, 
mainly deployed for keeping away another category of “undesirables”, i.e. migrants. According to the 
EUROPOL SOCTA (“Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment”) 2013, to combat facilitation 
of illegal migration should be the top priority of EUROPOL, coming even before the fight against 
other activities whose criminal character is more apparent like human trafficking or money 
laundering.
100
 Moreover, surveillance’s impact on migrants is huge not only because they are the first 
targets of European common security politics but also because they are affected in a way that often 
goes as far as taking their lives.
101
 Further examples are surveillance technologies for which targets are 
selected on the basis of a risk-profiling based on, for instance, their physical appearance (visual 
surveillance), their physical constitution (body scanners), or their behaviour when surfing on the 
internet (communication surveillance). 
The question arises whether existing studies elaborate strategies for recruiting interviewees that could 
reflect such circumstances, i.e. to adequately represent in their results the views of those who are most 
affected by surveillance. 
The table in Annex 3 shows the recruitment strategy for the 15 studies that base their conclusions on 
self-conducted surveys instead of relying on pre-existing ones.  
Nine out of these 15 studies use recruitment strategies or interview-media that indirectly exclude those 
most often targeted by surveillance, such as beggars, homeless, alcohol and drug addicts and 
undocumented migrants or migrants who do not manage to become residents in the EU. Seven of these 
nine studies (underlined in Annex 3) exclude non-resident persons (therefore homeless, undocumented 
migrants and migrants who attempted to come to Europe but failed) from their sample either because 
they address residents only or because they use means of communication presupposing residency 
(landline phone and mail).
102
 The remaining two (in italics in Annex 3) specifically target, at least as a 
                                                     
99 M. Gill, A. Spriggs, Assessing the impact of CCTV, cit., p. 117. See also L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, The Surveillance 
Consensus, cit.; L. Hempel, E. Töpfer, URBAN EYE WP 15, cit.; K-H. Reuband, Video berwachung, cit.; B. Brown, 
CCTV in Town Centres, cit., p. 40 and s. Graham et al., Towns on the Television, cit., p. 18. 
100
 SOCTA 2013, “Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, p. 41, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/eu-
serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-socta, last visit August 19th, 2015.  
101
 See http://fortresseurope.blogspot.de/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-frontiers-of-europe_16.html and the Judgement of the 
European Courts of Human Rights Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, 23.02.2012, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-
press/pages/search.aspx#{%22display%22:[%221%22],%22dmdocnumber%22:[%22901572%22]}, both last visited on 
August 19th, 2015.  
102
 Three of them (the PRISE studies and EUROBAROMETER 225), in addition to the approach by mail, also recruited their 
sample through media that do not necessarily exclude “marginal” people such as advertising in newspapers and personal 
Elisa Orrù 
36 
part of the sample, students, thus also contributing to overrepresent particular, non-deviant and non-
marginal groups.  
Six studies remain (in bold in Annex 3), which approach people in publicly accessible spaces such as 
streets, public means of transportation and shopping areas and which may also include in their sample 
so-called marginal and deviant people. In fact, one of them mentions three self-reportedly homeless 
people taking part in the interview.
103
 None of these studies, however, tried actively to select their 
sample in a way that is representative of the people most targeted by surveillance.
104
  
Since almost all the 15 studies, with the only exception of two, refer exclusively to visual surveillance, 
typically to CCTV, the following observations will deal with this kind of surveillance. As far as visual 
surveillance through CCTV is concerned, we may conclude that the perception of surveillance by its 
privileged targets is underrepresented and that they mostly assume an “internal” point of view with 
regard to the society and to Europe. 
Consequently, there is a need to conduct surveys which give due weight to the points of view of those 
who are mostly affected by surveillance such as beggars, street-traders, alcoholics.  
It remains to verify whether such conclusions apply to other surveillance areas as well, but this is a 
task for another day. 
As to the developed methodology, the research carried out for this paper is pioneering work: as far as 
the authors know, no literature exists on how to specifically address perception issues in the design 
phase of new technologies.  
Due to the initial character of such research, further developments on all the relevant topics, and in 
particular on MHbD, TbD and AbD is needed.  
The part of the research that could rely more on existing literature is the part on MHbD. However, as 
we have seen, research so far has almost exclusively concentrated on PbD and related issues such as 
data protection. However, as argued above, the PbD approach is unsatisfactory for our purposes 
because its focus is both too broad and too narrow. On the one hand PbD, in spite of its name, merges 
different levels of intervention, not referring only to the design phase of new technologies but also 
targeting the whole life cycle of complex surveillance systems. On the other hand, PbD focuses only 
on information privacy, whereas there is a need to consider infractions of other fundamental rights and 
values as well, as I sought to do by introducing the notion of MHbD. Technical research in this 
direction, including proposals on how to design technologies in order to minimise their harm on 
individuals and society beyond privacy violations would be much welcome.  
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Annex 1: Table of effects and side effects of surveillance 
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EFFECTS AND SIDE EFFECTS OF SURVEILLANCE 
 
Potential sources of 
negative perception:  
 
 Technologies perceived 
as threats 
 Security dilemma and 
surveillance spiral 
 Fear of misuse (incl. 
function creep) 
 Fear of insufficient 
protection of personal 
data 
 Fear of unlimited 
expansion and 
irreversibility 
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Potential 
consequences  
of negative 
perception: 
 
 Self-surveillance 
 Chilling effect 
 Conformism and 
loss of autonomy 
 
Impact on society: 
 
 
 
 Control society 
 Social exclusion 
and 
discrimination 
 Social 
homogenisation 
 Decline of 
solidarity 
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Annex 2: List of studies on the perception of surveillance  
 
 
Year Project/author Title Publication place P NP 
E/S
E 
P&
E 
Type of 
surveillance 
1999 S. Graham et al. Towns on the Television: Closed Circuit TV 
Surveillance in British towns and cities 
http://www.ncl.ac.uk/   ✓  Visual 
2000 J. Ditton Crime and the city. Public Attitudes towards 
Open-Street CCTV in Glasgow 
The British Journal of 
Criminology, 40 (2000) 4, 692-
709 
  ✓ ✓ Visual 
2001 G. Klocke et al. Das Hintert rchen des Nichtwissens B rgerrechte  Polizei: CILIP, 
69 (2001) 2, http://www.cilip.de 
   ✓ Visual 
2001 K-H. Reuband Video berwachung. as B rger von der 
Überwachung halten 
Neue 
Kriminalpolitik, 13 (2001), 2, 5-
9 
 
   ✓ Visual 
2002 B. C. Welsh, D. P. 
Farrington 
Home Office Research Study 252, Crime 
prevention effects of closed circuit television: a 
systematic review 
http://www.popcenter.org/    ✓ Visual 
2004 URBAN EYE WP 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report http://www.urbaneye.net/ 
 
 ✓ ✓  Visual 
2004 URBAN EYE WP 13, What do people think of CCTV. 
Findings from a Berlin Survey 
http://www.urbaneye.net/   ✓ ✓ Visual 
2005 M. Gill, A. 
Spriggs 
Assessing the impact of CCTV, Home Office 
Research Study 292 
https://www.cctvusergroup.com/    ✓ Visual 
2005 C. Ketzer Securitas ex Machina. Von der Bedeutung 
technischer  ontroll- und 
 berwachungssysteme f r esellschaft und 
Pädagogik 
 
http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de   ✓  Visual 
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2006 NG-Kruelle et al.  Biometrics and e-identity (e-passport) in the 
European Union: End-user perspectives on the 
adoption of a controversial innovation 
Journal of Theoretical and 
Applied Commerce Research, 1 
(2006), 2, 12-35 
http://www.jtaer.com/ 
  ✓  Biometrics 
2006 Chen-Yu Lin  ffentliche Video berwachung in den USA, 
Großbritannien und Deutschland – Ein Drei-
Länder-Vergleich 
http://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/   ✓ ✓  Visual 
2006 EPTA ICT and Privacy in Europe. Experiences from 
technology assessment of ICT and Privacy in 
seven different European countries 
http://www.ta-swiss.ch   ✓  Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
2007 M. Gill et al. Public perceptions of CCTV in residential 
areas : “It is not as good as we thought it would 
be” 
International Criminal Justice 
Review 17(2007), 304-324 
  ✓ ✓ Visual 
2008 Gallup 
Organization  
EUROBAROMETER 225 – Data Protection in 
the European Union. Citizens’ perceptions 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opini
on/index_en.htm 
 ✓   Data 
2008 V. Pavone, M. 
Pereira 
The privacy Vs security dilemma in a risk 
society. Insights from the PRISE project on the 
public perception of new security technologies 
in Spain 
http://www.wiscnetwork.org   ✓  Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
2008 PRISE D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on 
Security Technology and Privacy 
http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/   ✓ ✓ Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
2009 D. Williams, J. 
Ahmed 
The Relationship Between Antisocial 
Stereotypes and Public CCTV Systems: 
https://uhra.herts.ac.uk   ✓ ✓ Visual 
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Exploring Fear of Crime in the Modern 
Surveillance Society 
2009 L. Hempel, E. 
Töpfer 
The Surveillance Consensus : Reviewing the 
Politics of CCTV in Three European Countries 
European Journal of 
Criminology, 6 (2009), 2, 157-
177 
  ✓ ✓ Visual 
2010 A. T. O’ Donnel et 
al. 
Who is watching over you? The role of shared 
identity in perceptions of surveillance  
European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 40 (2010), 135–147 
✓    Visual 
2010 N. Zurawski ‘It is all about perceptions’: CCTV, feelings of 
safety and perceptions of space - what the 
people say  
Security Journal, 23 (2010), 
259-275 
  ✓ ✓ Visual 
2010 CPSI Analytical Standpoint 13, Summary of CPSI 
Country Case Studies 
http://www.esci.at    ✓  
2011 C. Bozzoli, C. 
Müller 
Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist 
shock: Evidence from the UK 
European Journal of Political 
Economy, 27 (2011), 89-106 
✓     
2011 W. Peissl et al. Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen der 
Videoüberwachung 
http://epub.oeaw.ac.at/   ✓  Visual 
2011 M. Apelt, N. 
Möllers 
 ie intelligente“ Video berwachung 
erforschen? Ein Res mee aus zehn Jahren 
Forschung zu Video berwachung 
Zeitschrift für Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolit (2011), 4, 585–
593 
  ✓ ✓ Visual 
2012 PRESCIENT D3, Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in 
new and emerging technologies: Assessing 
citizens’ concerns and knowledge of stored 
personal data 
http://www.prescient-project.eu/ ✓    Data 
2012 SAPIENT Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of 
the Art 
http://www.sapientproject.eu ✓    Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
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2012 PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6  http://www.projectpact.eu/docu
ments-1 
  ✓  Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
2012 PACT D1.4 Societal Impact Report http://www.projectpact.eu/   ✓ ✓ Visual 
Data 
 
2013 PRISMS D7.1: Report on Existing Surveys http://prismsproject.eu ✓    Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
 
P = Perception in general  
NP = European Overview on negative perception 
E/SE = Effect and side effects 
P&E = Perception and effectiveness 
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Annex 3: Recruitment strategy of the studies 
 
Year Project/author Title Sample size 
Recruitment strategy 
/ Targeted people 
Type of surveillance 
1999 S. Graham et al. Towns on the Television: Closed Circuit TV Surveillance in 
British towns and cities 
 Pre-existing studies Visual 
2000 J. Ditton Crime an the city. Public Attitudes towards Open-Street 
CCTV in Glasgow 
3.074 Street interviews with 
local residents 
Visual 
2001 G. Klocke et al. Das Hintert rchen des Nichtwissens 120 Street interviews with 
residents, randomly 
selected 
Visual 
2001 K-H. Reuband Video berwachung. as B rger von der  berwachung 
halten 
1.568 Mail. Addresses 
randomly selected from 
the residents’ (1 +) 
register 
Visual 
2002 B. C. Welsh, D. P. 
Farrington 
Home Office Research Study 252, Crime prevention effects 
of closed circuit television: a systematic review 
 Pre-existing studies Visual 
2004 URBAN EYE WP 15: CCTV in Europe, Final Report 1.001 resp. Street interviews Visual 
2004 URBAN EYE WP 13, What do people think of CCTV. Findings from a 
Berlin Survey 
203 
 
Street interviews 
outside shopping malls 
Visual 
2005 M. Gill, A. 
Spriggs 
Assessing the impact of CCTV, Home Office Research 
Study 292 
13.104  s. Gill 2007 Visual 
2005 C. Ketzer                                                    
        -                                         
und Pädagogik 
 
12 Users of public 
transportation  
Visual 
2006 NG-Kruelle et al.  Biometrics and e-identity (e-passport) in the European 
Union: End-user perspectives on the adoption of a 
269  Internet survey with EU-
citizens: MBA students 
Biometrics 
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controversial innovation 
2006 Chen-Yu Lin  ffentliche Video berwachung in den USA,  ro britannien 
und Deutschland – Ein Drei-Länder-Vergleich 
 Pre-existing studies Visual 
2006 EPTA ICT and Privacy in Europe. Experiences from technology 
assessment of ICT and Privacy in seven different European 
countries 
 Pre-existing studies Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location  
2007 M. Gill et al. Public perceptions of CCTV in residential areas : “It is not as 
good as we thought it would be” 
9.121 In-home interviews with 
residents. Households 
selected through random 
sampling method 
Visual 
2008 Gallup 
Organization  
EUROBAROMETER 225 – Data Protection in the European 
Union. Citizens’ perceptions 
27.000 Typically: Landline-
telephone interviews. 
Also: personal 
interviews (15+) 
Data 
2008 V. Pavone, M. 
Pereira 
The privacy Vs security dilemma in a risk society. Insights 
from the PRISE project on the public perception of new 
security technologies in Spain 
25-35 Spanish citizens.  
For recruitment strategy 
s. PRISE D5.8. 
Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
2008 PRISE D5.8, Synthesis Report - Interview Meetings on Security 
Technology and Privacy 
158 Typically: invitation by 
mail for interview 
meetings. Also: phone; 
advertising 
Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
2009 D. Williams, J. 
Ahmed 
The Relationship Between Antisocial Stereotypes and 
Public CCTV Systems: Exploring Fear of Crime in the 
120 Visitors of the central 
public shopping area. 
Visual 
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Modern Surveillance Society Randomly selected 
2009 L. Hempel, E. 
Töpfer 
The Surveillance Consensus : Reviewing the Politics of 
CCTV in Three European Countries 
 Existing studies Visual 
2010 A  T  O’ Donnel et 
al. 
Who is watching over you? The role of shared identity in 
perceptions of surveillance 
251 Visitors of the city 
centre (16+) and 
students in a British 
University 
Visual 
2010 N. Zurawski ‘I               p    p     ’: CCTV, feelings of safety and 
perceptions of space - what the people say 
216 Visitors of the 
“                  ” 
in the city centre. 
Random approach (3 
homeless) 
Visual 
2010 CPSI Analytical Standpoint 13, Summary of CPSI Country Case 
Studies 
 Pre-existing surveys  
2011 C. Bozzoli, C. 
Müller 
Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: 
Evidence from the UK 
 Pre-existing surveys  
2011 W. Peissl et al. Aktuelle datenschutzrechtliche Fragen der 
Videoüberwachung 
 Pre-existing surveys Visual 
2011 M. Apelt, N. 
Möllers 
 ie intelligente“ Video berwachung erforschen? Ein 
Res mee aus zehn Jahren Forschung zu Video berwachung 
 Pre-existing surveys Visual 
2012 PRESCIENT D3, Privacy, data protection and ethical issues in new and 
emerging technologies: Assessing citizens’ concerns and 
knowledge of stored personal data 
 Pre-existing surveys Data 
2012 SAPIENT Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance – State of the Art  Pre-existing surveys Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
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2012 PACT Summary of PACT deliverables D1.1 - D1.6  Pre-existing surveys Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
Sensors 
2012 PACT  D1.4 Societal Impact Report  Pre-existing surveys Visual 
Data 
 
2013 PRISMS D7.1: Report on Existing Surveys  Pre-existing surveys Visual 
Biometrics 
Communication  
Data 
Location 
 
Studies whose sample selecting strategy excludes non-resident persons.  
Studies that specifically target students, at least as a part of the sample.  
Studies whose sample recruitment strategy potentially includes so-called marginal and deviant people. 
  
Annex 4: List of FP6 and FP7 projects relevant for issues on surveillance perceptions 
 
 
FP6 
 
 BITE - Biometric Identification Technologies Ethics, http://www.biteproject.org 
 
 HUMABIO - Human monitoring and authentication using biodynamic indicators and 
behavioural analysis, www.humabio-eu.org 
 
 
FP 7 
 
 CPSI - Changing Perceptions of Security and Interventions, www. cpsi-fp7.eu  
 
 DETECTER - Detection Technologies, Terrorism, Ethics, and Human Rights, 
http://www.detecter.eu/  
 
 HIDE- Homeland Security, Biometric Identification & Personal Detection Ethics, 
http://www.hideproject.org/  
 
 IRISS - Increasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies, http://irissproject.eu/ 
 
 PACT - Public perception of security and privacy: Assessing knowledge, Collecting evidence, 
Translating research into action, http://www.projectpact.eu/ 
 
 PRACTIS - Privacy – Appraising Challenges to Technologies and Ethics, www.practis.org 
 
 PRISE - Privacy enhancing shaping of security research and technology – A participatory 
approach to develop acceptable and accepted principles for European Security Industries and 
Policies, http://www.prise.oeaw.ac.at/. 
 
 PRISMS - The PRIvacy and Security MirrorS: Towards a European framework for integrated 
decision making, http://prismsproject.eu/ 
 
 RESPECT - Rules, Expectations & Security through Privacy-Enhanced Convenient 
Technologies, http://respectproject.eu/ 
 
 RISE - Rising Pan European & International Awareness of Biometrics & Security Ethics. For 
details see the project’s website: http://www.riseproject.eu/  
 
 SAPIENT - Supporting fundamental rights, Privacy and Ethics in Surveillance Technologies, 
http://www.sapientproject.eu/ 
 
 SMART – Scalable Measures for Automated Recognition Technologies, 
http://www.smartsurveillance.eu/ 
 
 SurPRISE - Surveillance, Privacy and Security. A large scale participatory assessment of 
criteria and factors determining acceptability and acceptance of security technologies in 
Europe, www.surprise-project.eu/ 
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Annex 5: Table summarising methodology for incorporating perception issues in the 
design of new technologies 
 
Domain 
 
NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS 
 
 
PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS 
BA 
 
BACKGROUND CONDITIONS 

  
 
 
Check for side-effects:  
 
1. Technologies perceived as 
threats; 
2. Security dilemma and 
surveillance spiral; 
3. Fear of misuse (incl. function 
creep); 
4. Fear of insufficient protection of 
personal data; 
5. Fear of unlimited expansion and 
irreversibility. 
6. Self-surveillance; 
7. Chilling effect; 
8. Conformism and loss of 
autonomy. 
9. Control society;  
10. Social exclusion and 
discrimination;  
11. Social homogenisation;  
12. Decline of solidarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is the use of technology effective in the 
particular context? 
 
 
 
 
1
st
 level 
 
 
MHbD 
 
Effectiveness improvement 
 
2
nd
 level 
 
TbD 
 
TbD 
 
 
3
rd
 level 
 
 
AbD 
 
/ 
Beyond 
design  
 
Social – institutional – political- legal measures 
 
  
 
